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This thesis examines draft-avoidance in the context of contemporary Russia. The objective of 
the research is  to shed light on  army-avoiders' views and reflections, not only for a better 
understanding of the issue of  the  conscription crisis,  but  also to provide insights into  the 
transition from the Soviet  to the Russian era  and how young men negotiate and relate to 
processes  of  social  change.  To  meet  this  objective,  the  study  draws  on  nine  qualitative 
interviews with young Russian men. As a conceptual framework for analysis, the study uses a 
gender  perspective,  especially  masculinity.  The  term  empowerment,  including  the 
supplementary categories of identity, agency and critical consciousness, has been chosen as a 
theoretical lens to further illuminate the interviewees' views on conscription and experiences 
of draft-avoidance.
The study findings  indicate  that  the  interviewees  wished to  avoid  the  draft  because  they 
viewed the  conscription  system  and  military  service  as  disempowering,  as  well  as 
contradictory  to  their  personal  life  aspirations.  The  findings  also  suggest  that  emerging 
masculinity notions and values integral to market capitalism contribute to empowering self-
identifications, and thus play an important role in the process of draft-avoidance. Moreover, 
the findings indicate that draft-avoidance can be seen as a manifestation of the interviewees' 
ability to act as reflective and critical social agents who seek to actively direct their own lives. 
Furthermore,  draft-avoidance  appeared  to  be  the  interviewees'  way  of  managing  the 
contradictory challenges and expectations that the individual meets in a transitional society.
Analytically,  the study brings evidence to the on-going debate that there is coexistence of 
change and continuity, and that in a transitional period, namely this can create tensions and 
conflicts, which the deepening crisis of the conscription system and growing draft-avoidance 
in Russia are an example of.
Key  words agency,  continuity,  critical  consciousness,  draft-avoidance,  empowerement, 
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The Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, throwing Russia1 into turmoil. The disappearance of state 
ideology, that for over 70 years had defined the direction of the society,  led  to radical economic, 
political and social  changes (Oushakine 2009: 1). Further,  the transition to both market economy 
and democracy had ”no clear set of rules or paths to follow” (ibid.: 4). Even today, 20 years after 
the emergence of the Russian Federation,  uncertainty seems to characterize  Russia's  process of 
”defining and redefining itself” (Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2002) in the post-Soviet era. Hence, it 
is not unusual to hear Russians state that they have no idea where the country is heading, and what 
will await them in the future.
At the micro level, in ordinary people's lives, the end of Soviet rule meant new challenges and 
responsibilities,  but  also  new  democratic  freedoms.  As  the  authoritarian  state  weakened  and 
loosened its grip on the citizens, the etacratic social order (Zdravomyslova and Temkina 2007), 
where every citizen's “social standing and identity” were defined “by their position in relation to the 
state”, started to break down (Meshcherkina 2000: 105-106). Whereas before ”in order to prosper, a 
man had to submit to the rules of the game” and the collective, now one could no longer expect the 
state to provide everything one needed for a worthy life (ibid.; also Belovranin 2011: 7). The abrupt 
transition to market system set new requirements for everyday survival, and people were compelled 
to become less dependent on the state. As a result, the unidirectionality that had characterized the 
Soviet society had to give way to pluralism in the form of new practices, strategies, values and 
identities typical for a capitalist society2. (Ashwin & Lytkina 2004; Kay 2007: 2; Kiblitskaya 2000; 
Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2003b: 58; Mescherkina 2000).
In  the  post-Soviet  era,  one  of  the  main  fault  lines  between  the  state  and  citizens  has  been 
compulsory military service and maintenance of the Soviet-style conscription system. Young men 
evade the draft  in  growing numbers,  but in recent  years,  the government has merely sought  to 
strengthen the institution,  notwithstanding its own promises about transition to a contract-based 
professional army. Maintaining the old conscription-based recruitment system is often justified with 
the lack of financial resources. However, universal male conscription is not only a question about 
1 I regard Imperial Russia, the Soviel Union and the Russian Federation as one country, which is the common way of thinking 
among Russians, too (Taylor 2003: xi). The USSR was, of course, more than Russia and consisted altogether of fifteen republics  
that today are independent states with fates  of their own. Neverthelss,  the Russian predominance in the Soviet Union with  
Moscow as the unquestionable center was evident (Sakwa 2008: 209; Hedetoft with Blum 2008: 18).
2 As for example Berthoud (2003: 70, 83) points out, market capitalism is not only a question of how to organize the economic 
sphere but ”the market mentality” and ”economic logic [are] projected on to the social whole”, affecting value systems and 
people's relationships both to each other and to the state.
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money. As  Gol'ts (2005: 203) points out,  inability to imagine the country without an enormous 
army, that trains every male citizen to be a soldier, is part of the logic of militarised society.
1.1 Russian military in crisis
As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the new Russian Federation inherited its Cold War superpower 
army  –  weakened  and  outdated  in  many  aspects  (Mikhailenok  2006:  112),  but  nevertheless 
“accustomed to getting its own way” (Sakwa 2008: 392). The economic collapse of the 1990s shook 
the military badly throwing it into a deep crises, which it has not been able to overcome to date. 
However,  it  has shown striking resistance to  change and remains  in  many ways,  including the 
conscription system, a copy of its precedent, the Soviet army (Gudkov 2006: 56). The military is the 
last state institution that has not been reformed, even though the whole society around it has gone 
through drastic changes after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Gol'ts 2005; Belovranin 2011; 
Sakwa 2008: 395). It has been blamed for being a closed, archaic and nomenclatural3 institution. 
Instead of defending the interests of the majority, the army is said to represent a small elite group 
and  thus  undermine  the  country's  democratic  development  as  a  whole  (Belovranin  2011:  8; 
Mikhailenok 2006: 121-123; Gudkov 2006: 56). Even though debate about the urgent need for 
radical improvements has been going on since Boris Yeltsin's4 presidency, a truly successful and 
thorough military reform still waits to be carried out (Baev 1996; Mikhailenok 2006: 113-114).
Today, the Russian army still relies to a considerable degree on Soviet military doctrine and the 
traditional way of fighting a war that counts on unlimited human resources and the bravery of the 
Russian soldier5, disregarding lives lost (Gol'ts  2005: 202; Gudkov 2006: 56). In other words, the 
military strategy is based on the idea that winning a war is not so much about high technology and 
professionalized training as it is about having the biggest number of men to sacrifice in the battle 
(Gol'ts 2005). Essential to this strategy is mass mobilization through conscription. However, the 
Ministry of Defence faces grave and constant difficulties in trying to implement the biannual draft. 
In fact, a small minority of young men eligible for military service reports at the enlistment offices6. 
Recruitment difficulties have already undermined the army's performance ability. Hence, the crises 
of  the  Russian  armed  forces  is  to  a  significant  degree  a  crises  of  its  Soviet-style  conscription 
system. (Pantelogiannis 2003: 11; Spivak & Pridemore 2004: iii; Eichler 2006; Petrov 2003: 292).
3 The Russian term nomenklatura (Engl. nomenclature) refers to the privileged bureaucratic Communist party elite in the Soviet 
Union.
4 The first president of the Russian Federation, 1991-1999.
5 According to Vihavainen (2008: 297), the exceptional combat fitness of Russian soldier is an important part of Russian national 
mythology.
6 http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100401/158394675.html  , http://www.spacedaily.com/2002/021206145741.ooyw2y54.html
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Army, conscription and the question about Russia's future
The disintegration of the USSR weakened significantly Russia's position in the international arena 
(Sperling 2009: 218). However, since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, aspirations to return 
Russia  its  lost  prestige and superpower status  have grown stronger  (Oushakine 2009: 7;  Pirani 
2009: 119). The armed forces had been the key pillar of the Soviet power  (Hedetoft with Blum 
2008: 19). In the government's view, not only  Russia's past but also its future as a strong state 
depend  on  the  military.  Furthermore,  like  in  the  Soviet  period,  compulsory  military  service 
continues to be seen as the core of the strength of the armed forces. (Eichler 2012: Sperling 2009;  
Sperling 2003: 240). 
Despite the uncertain times that the country has gone through, the army has always remained loyal 
and supportive of those in power (Smirnov 2009: 101). During its 20-year-long history, the Russian 
Federation has been involved in several military conflicts7. However, from time to time, it has been 
uncertain if the state authorities can rely on the military as an efficient instrument that will help to  
attain its foreign policy goals. The latest demonstration of the ineffectiveness and outdatedness of 
the Russian military and its strategies took place in 2008, when it was unable to ”easily defeat even 
such a weak enemy as Georgia” (Golts 2011: 4; de Haas 2011: 5). 
In his  speech from 2006, president Putin tied young men's  willingness to join the army to the 
question about Russia's future and fate in the following way (see also Sperling 2009: 231):
We must  explain to  the entire generation of young people  that  the question of  whether or not to serve in the army  
should not even come up for a young person to begin with. We must all realize that without the army there would be no 
country. Nobody should have the slightest doubt on this score. No army, no Russia.(Quoted in Blum 2006: 2).
As the quotation above demonstrates, the current Russian leadership considers itself an 'educator'8 
whose task is to shape the citizens' consciousness (Nikonova 2010: 360). In practice, it has tried to 
do this through patriotic education programs9. As part of them, Soviet-style basic military training 
has been (re-)introduced first as an elective, and later as a compulsory subject in schools as of 2003 
(Sakwa 2008: 405; Webber & Zilberman 2006: 179-180). By targeting especially male youth at an 
7 Chechnya in 1994-1996 and 1999-2003, Georgia 2008
8 The idea of ”the pedagogical mission of the Russian state” in relation to its citizens can be traced back to the 18 th century and 
Catherine the Great  (Nikonova 2010:  360).  Inspired by the ideas of the French Enlightenment,  the tsarina's  view was that  
ordinary people  needed to be educated and controlled by an enlightened autocrat.  According to Nikonova (idib.),  this  idea  
”gradually became a tradition of imperial  political culture, which was later inherited by the Soviet regime” and the current  
Russian leadership. 
9 http://archives.ru/programs/patriot_2015.shtml  
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early stage of their identity formation processes, the government hopes to enhance willingness to 
join the army (Shaburova 2005:  94).  It  wishes to mould young men into patriots  who identify 
themselves with the role of soldier and support the government in its attempts to restore Russia's 
status as a military superpower (Sperling 2009: 218-234)10.
1.2 Topics in earlier research
The problematic situation of the Russian armed forces and the topic of draft-avoidance along with it 
have been widely discussed not only in the media but also in academic research both in Russia and 
internationally.  Several  Russian  researchers  have  been  occupied  with  studying  young  people's 
perceptions of military service (e.g. Shevtsov 2006; Klement'ev & Nikolaeva 2000; Peven' 1997). 
Many times Russian research about the topic tends to feed directly into policy debates. Appearing 
supportive of the government's attempts to attract more recruits to the army, many argue that the 
main reason for today's young men's reluctance to serve can be found in lacking patriotic education 
(see Shevtsov 2006: 113; Petrov 2003: 298-299; Peven' 1997: 25). Devaluation of such concepts as 
'duty to the motherland' and army as 'school of life', together with the damaged image of the armed 
forces  and  lowering  prestige  of  military  professions,  are  often  mentioned  as  the  main  factors 
explaining  the  growing draft-avoidance  (Petrov  2003:  294;  Klement'ev  & Nikolaeva  2000:  73; 
Serebryannikov 1999: 42; Peven' 1997: 22).
Furthermore,  Russian researchers  have also blamed 'pacifist11 propaganda'  for  advocating  draft-
evasion (Peven' 1997: 24; also Ivanova 2003). Such claims, however, appear to be in contradiction12 
with survey results, according to which 74 per cent of young Russians stated that they were ready to 
defend their families, but only 25 per cent said they would fight for the independence of the Russian 
state13 (Peven' 1997: 25). Caiazza's (2002: 108) view that wide-spread draft-avoidance is rather an 
expression of ”substantial dissatisfaction with the Russian regime” than spreading pacifism seems 
thus more convincing. Petrov (2003: 295), on the other hand, sees that the underlying reason for 
draft-avoidance can be found in the changing value system: for today's young Russians personal 
profit has become more important than the common good or the interest of the state14.
10 http://www.gazeta.ru/news/social/2010/02/02/n_1452031.shtml  , http://archives.ru/programs/patriot_2015.shtml
11 According to Pavlova (1999), pacifism had a bad name also in the Soviet Union where it was labeled as bourgeois.
12 I understand pacifism as an ethical standpoint that condems ”war immoral by its very nature” (Cady 2010: 76).
13 In Gavrilyuk & Malenkov's (2007) study about young people's values in Tjumenskaya oblast', 48,9 per cent of repondents stated 
they were ready to defend the fatherland. In Kay's (2006: 209) study, “[m]en's attitudes to military service reveal[ed] a strong 
sense of moral responsibility and an acceptance of a male obligation to protect and to serve”. Thus, pacifism hardly explains the 
scale of draft-avoidance in Russia.
14 Also several other studies suggest that 'Western-style' values and ideals such as individualism, independence and freedom are 
strengthening in post-Soviet Russia (see e.g. Petrov 2008; Skutneva 2003; Ashwin 2000: 18; Meshcherkina 2000: 109;  Ruchkin 
1998).
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In their survey study for draftees, Klement'ev and Nikolaeva (2000) sought to find out what kind of 
factors determine young men's  attitude towards military service.  Among their  155 respondents, 
negative attitudes were prevalent. The main reasons contributing to this were fear and perceived 
chaos in the armed forces, loss of personal resources, and lack of prestige and profit. Klement'ev 
and  Nikolaeva  argue,  however,  that  the  responses  were  contradictory;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
draftees acknowledged also potential  positive outcomes and elements of military service. These 
included, for example,  development of physical strength. Comparing both negative and positive 
opinions, Klement'ev and Nikolaeva come the conclusion that military service has not lost its value 
for young men, but what they struggle with is to see what real prospects it could offer.
In her extensive study Men in Contemporary Russia: The Fallen Heroes of Post-Soviet Change?, 
Kay (2006)  has  dedicated  one  chapter  to  analyzing  men's  views  about  military  service.  Kay's 
findings point to a generational gap. For those who had served in the armed forces in the Soviet 
Union, military service was a source of pride and it was viewed as a positive experience, a male 
duty and a patriotic act. On the other hand, as Kay describes, those of the older generation who for 
some reason had not been in the army in their  youth were embarrassed and awkward about it. 
However, today's young men of conscription age were much less positive and more critical towards 
obligatory military service. (Kay 2006: 17, 60, 62, 64).
According  to  Kay  (2006:  67-68),  compulsory  military  service  often  conflicts  with  other 
“responsibilities and obligations” young Russians face in the context of market economy. Hence, 
Kay sees that the main reason for today's young men's reluctance to join the army lies in ”new 
socio-economic realities”, that is, the pressing need to get a decent job and keep it in order to get by 
or to enter on a career (Kay 2006: 17, 67-68). Moreover, like Klement'ev & Nikolaeva (2000: 73),  
Kay (2006:  67)  argues  that  many regard  the  time spent  in  the  service  as  a  waste  of  personal 
resources because they simply do not see how the training could be of use in civil occupations.
Further,  Semenova and Utkina  (2004:  127,  130)  have  studied  teenage boys'  perceptions  of  the 
relatively new Russian holiday of 23rd of February, the Defender of the Fatherland day. They claim 
that one of the reasons why so few identify with the role of soldier is that today's young people have 
not internalized the ”bloc consciousness” that Soviet generations were brought up to, and have not, 
thus, adopted the traditional enemy images. Serebryannikov (1999: 41-42) makes a similar note: 
compared to the 1980s, perceiving another state as a threat to Russia has become 2 to 3 times less 
common. As a consequence, even 70 per cent of young Russians consider maintaining an army 
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unnecessary.
Moreover, Semenova and Utkina (2004: 130) suggest that for today's Russian youth, the military no 
longer represents a crucial element for constructing and expressing one's masculinity. The same 
argument is also made by Eichler who has studied the Chechen wars from a gender perspective. She 
claims  that  the  large-scale  army-avoidance  is  a  concret  manifestation  of  ”the  weakened  link 
between masculinity and the military in post-Soviet Russia”. According to Eichler, dedovshchina15 
is one of the main reasons that leads so many men to reject the role of soldier: ”[T]he brutality of 
these practices and the many consequential deaths have made it increasingly difficult to maintain 
the gendered myth that strategies of humiliation and abuse are necessary to turn conscripts into 
'men'.” Further, the link between masculinity and the military is also undermined by the growing 
influence of new notions of capitalist masculinity. (Eichler 2006: 491-493).
Eichler  has  further  developed  her  study  about  demilitarization  and  remilitarization  of  Russian 
society in her book Militarizing men: Gender, conscription and war in Post-Soviet Russia (2012). 
Taking feminist international relations and the concept of militarized masculinity as her theoretical 
starting  points,  Eichler  analyses  the  viewpoints  of  both  activists  from  the  Soldiers'  mothers' 
movements,  Chechen  war  veterans  and  draft  evaders.  Her  conclusion  is  that  “militarized 
masculinity has been both challenged and reinforced in post-Soviet Russia”.
Taken together, despite the fact that much of research has been motivated by the conscription crisis 
caused  by  widespread  draft-avoidance,  no  study  has  focused  particularly  on  draft-avoiders' 
perspective. For example, in both Peven' (1997) and Klement'ev & Nikolaeva's (2000) surveys all 
respondents were conscript soldiers. Further, a considerable amount of attention has been dedicated 
to studying and analysing the work of the Committee of the Soldiers' Mothers, a non-governmental 
organization that is very active in discussions about conscription and military service, and which is 
often  regarded  as  the  voice  of  draft-avoiders  in  the  public  (e.g.  Caiazza  2002;  Eichler  2006; 
Zawilski 2010).
1.3 Problem statement
This study seeks to bring focus to the perspectives of young Russian men who have wished and 
managed to avoid compulsory military service,  and their  viewpoints  on conscription and draft-
15 Brutal bullying and hazing of new conscripts
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avoidance. In this way, by tapping into the draft-avoiders' reflections, it hopes to create better and 
fuller  understanding  of  the  phenomenon  as  a  whole.  The  study's  position  is  that,  in  order  to 
understand draft-avoidance, it is necessary to shed light on the issue at the level of individual men 
and obtain first-hand knowledge from draft-avoiders themselves. The study seeks to achieve this by 
giving priority to 1st person accounts and vocalizing social actors that have  been mostly silent in 
discussions concerning conscription and compulsory military service (see Caiazza 2002).
Furthermore, the study aims to provide insights into the transition from the Soviet era to the Russian 
and how young men as social actors relate to  social  change.  The young men's  immediate social 
context  is  increasingly  characterized  by  the  processes  of  globalization  and  market  capitalism. 
However, at the same time, the context is also shaped by the structures of the old Soviet society in 
the form of the conscription system and Soviet notions of male citizenship and masculinity ideals 
that the state continues to hold on to (Eichler 2012: 84). Hence, through the personal and individual, 
this study seeks to be a tool for understanding wider processes of change and continuity in today's  
Russia (see McLeod & Thomson 2009: 8-10).
1.4 Research questions
Against this context, the main question this thesis aims to answer is: Why do young Russian men 
seek to avoid compulsory military service?
To  be  able  to  answer  the  research  question,  I  have  formulated  the  following  supplementary 
questions:
– What  are  the  draft-avoiders'  views  about  the  conscription  system  and  military 
service?
– What do they intend to do instead of going to the army?
– How do they rationalize and justify draft-avoidance?
– What kind of role do social networks, masculine identity and critical consciousness 
play in draft-avoidance?
– What do the young men's reflections and viewpoints mean for the understanding of 
processes of social change in today's Russia?
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1.5 Finding my thesis
Curiosity marked the beginning of this thesis project. In the spring of 2010, I was an exchange 
student at the Pomor State University in Archangel, North-West Russia. It was the 65 th anniversary 
of Soviet victory in World War II. Born in Finland, a country whose national identity is closely tied 
up with the trauma of the Winter and Continuation Wars, I have grown used to pompous, repetitive 
commemorations of war. However, after weeks and months, as the Victory Day of 9 th of May drew 
closer,  the  fact  that  in  the  Russian  spring  the  War  really  seemed  to  be  everywhere started  to 
overwhelm me. I thought: surely there is no need for so much repetition? After all, all the Russians I 
socialized with appeared to know the history of their country much better than what I was used to 
from home! Everybody knew the official story about the War, and the constant repetitions of it 
began only to feel more like a strange exaggeration – at least to me, an outsider. Only later, as I  
started to study more in-depth the meaning of the Great Patriotic War, I was to discover that its  
omnipresence was in no way a coincidence, but a project driven by the state, carefully designed and 
certainly not without a purpose.
My attention was especially drawn to the images of veterans and soldiers. Perhaps because they also 
seemed to be everywhere,  from postcards and posters lining the streets  to bookshops, cinemas, 
museums and special events at the university. If the War was the main topic, brave Soviet soldiers  
who defeated Hitler's army were the centre of that topic. In a newspaper, Russian boys assured that  
they would always be ready to defend the Fatherland, in the same way and in the same spirit as their 
grandfathers had done. I was used to this kind of stories from home where the narrative of the 
Winter  War  and the  innocent  Finland in  the  midst  of  superpower  games still  serves  well  as  a 
rationale for universal male conscription. A thousand times I had heard Finnish boys say that they 
will  go to the army and learn to defend the Fatherland so that veterans'  sacrifice would not be 
rendered meaningless.
I  was curious to know if Russia and Finland really had a lot  in common when it  came to the  
meaning of war as a motivator for my generation to join the army. After all, both countries have 
universal conscription that make all men liable for military service. Moreover, in both countries it is 
the very same great war but only from two different perspectives that is given a special meaning. 
Thus,  out  of curiosity,  I  started to talk about the topic with Russian boys I  met,  mostly at  the 
university.  In  Finland,  the  vast  majority  of  young  men  serve  in  the  military.  However,  to  my 
surprise, none of the Russians I got to know were planning nor expressed willingness to join the 
army. Quite the contrary, I got to hear amazing stories about youngsters who were specially trying 
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to avoid being drafted. I was puzzled, and wondered: why did the war narrative not work in the 
same way in Russia as it did in Finland? Why did so many young Russian men not take compulsory 
military service for granted? I wanted to understand better. That was the beginning of this thesis.
In the first place, my plan was to write about draft-avoidance from a masculinity perspective. After 
all, conscription is a gendered institution, and feminist research has shown that the military does not 
only produce  professional  soldiers  but,  more  importanly,  men  who identify themselves  with  a 
military or militarized notion of masculinity (see e.g. Eichler 2012). Further, in feminist research 
and critique of international relations, the militarization of men's identities has been connected to 
violence on both micro and macro levels, as well as to the classic dilemma of IR, namely that of 
War and Peace. In order to be able to wage war, a state has to make sure that at least a part of its  
male population identifies itself as soldiers who are ready to die for their country:
[T]he waging of war and the militarization of men ultimately depend on the decisions of individual citizens. Whether  
women and men accept the idea that military service is key to masculine identity and/or men's citizenship has direct  
consequences for state policies or war and militarization. […] Masculinity plays a central role in states' (re)production of 
military violence. […] Militarized masculinity is part of the foundation of the contemporary international system. Therefore  
an analysis of militarized masculinity enhances our understanding of how states and the international system operate, and 
the potential for their transformation. (Eichler 2012: 136-137).
Since my background was both in International Relations and gender studies, anchoring my study in 
this framework seemed like a logical, and not least a comfortable choice.
However,  the  focus  of  the  study  was  to  change  after  my  fieldwork  in  Russia  in  2011,  and 
interviewes with young men who had managed to avoid military service. I started to feel that my 
preliminary choice of theory was drawing attention away from what the interviewees themselves 
actually had highlighted and what was important for them. The original approach did not seem to 
resonate with the reflections and experiences the interviewees had shared with me. The concept of 
militarized masculinity appeared somewhat limiting and that it did little to help explain what draft-
avoidance was about for the avoiders themselves.
Unexpectedly, two articles inspired and helped me to find my thesis. The first was Cockburn's. She 
has written: ”Women's reflections on war are closer to those on the culturally attuned sociologist or 
anthropologist than those of the international relations discipline which […] tends to speak for and 
from  the  abstract  masculinity  of  statesmen,  diplomats  and  military”  (Cockburn  2010:  146). 
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Cockburn points to the importance of finding a right perspective. Thanks to her comment, I realized 
that I did not wish to write on an abstract level, nor in general, in a way that I feel is distanced and  
disconnected from actual people and their lived lifes. I did not want to reduce the interviewees' 
stories into generalizing descriptions of changing masculinities in today's Russia. In the light of the 
interview data, neither did questions about militarization of masculinity and Russian society seem 
relevant in their abstractness. I understood that I wanted to find a perspective that would make the  
young Russian men visible and heard, not bury their reflections and viewpoints under theoretical 
presuppositions.  Further,  another source of inspiration became Conway's  (2008) study on white 
South African conscientious  objectors  during  apartheid.  It  lent  me confidence to  analyse  draft-
avoidance in Russia from a new perspective, namely that of empowerment.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
The thesis  is  divided into  six  chapters.  In  the next  chapter,  the context  of  the study is  further 
detailed with focus on the history of conscription in Russia, and draft-avoidance today. Chapter 3 
discusses and reflects on the methodological issues of the study. Chapter 4 presents the conceptual 
framework  of  the  thesis.  Chapter  5  focuses  on  informant  presentation,  data  presentation  and 
analysis. Finally, a summary and concluding remarks will be offered in chapter 6.
10
Chapter 2. Conscription in Russia
This chapter focuses on conscription in Russia from both historical and contemporary perspectives. 
It begins with the Soviet period, especially the meaning of conscription at the time. It then looks at  
challenges facing the institution today, looking particularly at the issue of draft-avoidance. Taken 
together,  the chapter attempts an outline of the research context;  the changing dynamics of the 
conscription system in contemporary Russia.
2.1 The Soviet era16
The establishment of universal conscription in Russia  can be traced back to the time of Peter the 
Great17. In 1705, ”all classes of the population were [made] liable for military service” (Nikolaieff 
1949: 117-118). However, Peter's successors did not apply the principle of universality consistently. 
It was the Soviet constitution from 1936 that, on the eve of the World War II, re-established the  
institution of obligatory military service by declaring the defence of the fatherland as ”the sacred 
duty of every citizen18”. The law on conscription applied only to male citizens. (Nikolaieff 1949: 
125; Eichler 2012; Zhel'vis 2011: 231).
The re-establishment of universal male conscription was part of the development of Soviet society 
as a whole. The state aimed at creating a new Soviet citizen who would devote him-/herself to the 
noble cause of building and safeguarding communism (Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2003b: 27-28; 
Vodichev  & Lamin  2008:  118).  A central  part  of  the  project  was  establishing  a  gender-based 
division of labour, which would serve the needs of the state and where the conscription system 
played a key role (Ashwin 2000: 1; Tartakovskaya 2000: 118-119). As a consequence, the spectrum 
of socially accepted gender roles in Soviet society became strictly limited (Ashwin & Lytkina 2004: 
307).  Whereas the domestic sphere and parenting were left for women, every male citizen was 
treated as a potential soldier who was needed to defend the socialist motherland from ”the perceived 
military  threat  from capitalist  enemies”  (Schrand  2002:  203)19.  In  Caiazza's  (2002:  5)  words, 
”motherhood and military service represented the pinnacle of what female and male citizens were 
expected to contribute to society”. Hence, male citizenship was first and foremost defined in terms 
16 At its best, this section is a simplistic account of conscription in the Soviet period, as the scope of the thesis does not allow 
presenting and discussing every detail. It should be noted that the Soviet era was not a static period, but rather, the society 
developed and had a dynamic of its own, also the conscription system.
17 1682-1725
18 ”Article 132. Universal military service is law. Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is an honourable duty of 
the citizens of the U.S.S.R.” http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04.html#chap10
19 Nevertheless, also women were expected to work outside the home.
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of the duty of soldiering.
The purpose of two or three20 years of compulsory military service was not only to teach men 
soldiering. More importantly, the army was meant to be the school of communism that would “mold 
young men into patriotic and loyal citizens” (Eichler 2012; also Mikhailenok 2006: 112;  Gudkov 
2006:  41).  Furthermore,  the  military  was  also  presented  as  the  main  institution  of  male 
socialization, 'the school of life for men', and becoming a soldier as a rite of passage into manhood,  
a fulfilment of masculinity (Belovranin 2011: 7; Eichler 2012; Kon 2002). The notion that a man 
was not  a  real  man,  had  he  not  served in  the  army,  was  deliberately constructed  and actively 
propagated by the state, and most Soviet citizens came to subscribe to it (Belovranin 2011: 7). 
Hence, through conscription, the state successfully built a link between Soviet male identity and the 
role of soldier (Schrand 2002: 203).21 Since the USSR relied on the military as the foundation of its 
superpower position, this myth about manliness was part of an larger ideological system that served 
the interests of the state both on national and international levels (Belovranin 2011: 7; Hedetoft with 
Blum 2008: 19).
After the Great Patriotic War, the notion of military service as a sacred duty of every truly patriotic 
Soviet man grew only stronger (Kay 2006: 47). Veterans were heroized and made into ”role models 
for the younger generation” (Eichler 2012: 15). Up until mid-1970s, at least half of conscription 
aged men served in the armed forces (Gudkov 2006: 42).
The military was a powerful and central institution in the Soviet state22 (Belovranin 2011: 8). There 
was a prestige to military professions, and ”the role of soldier offered disadvantages as well as 
advantages to the individual man” (Schrand 2002: 204). On the one hand, if one wished to lead a 
comfortable life  without  troubles,  one had to submit  to the collective,  hierarchical order in  the 
military and in the society in general (Belovranin 2011: 7; Eichler 2012: 25). On the other hand, the 
army had an important and positive function as an institution of vertical social mobility. In other  
words, in the repressive society, it provided a channel to high status jobs and positions, and worked 
thus as a kind of 'social lift'. For many young men, joining the military meant a chance to leave 
behind the monotonous countryside or small town life somewhere in the periphery of the empire, to 
see and experience the world, as well as to change their life prospects. (Mikhailenok 2006: 106-107; 
20 In the navy, service lasted three years (Jones 1982; Andresen 2010).
21 All this is, of course, typical of all societies with universal male conscription.
22 According to Sakwa (2008: 392), ”[t]he USSR was one of the world's most militarised states with five million men under arms in 
1988 and another four million employed in defence industries”. Around 15 to 20 per cent of GDP was spent on the army. (see 
also Vihavainen 2008: 304).
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Gudkov 2006: 41).
2.2 The post-Soviet era and the conscription crisis
Military service loses popularity
According to Eichler (2012: 59), ”[d]raft evasion and desertion were marginal phenomena in Soviet 
society.” However, during the 1980s and 1990s, Russia's military discredited itself in a number of 
ways,  something  which  changed  people's  perceptions  of  conscription  drastically23.  The  failed 
military campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s was followed by the difficult and unpopular Chechen 
wars. In 2000, Russians were shocked by the accident of submarine Kursk. The poor conditions that 
conscripts had to bear with, including lack of food24 and adequate equipment, as well as the growing 
corruption and lack of discipline in the armed forces were made commonly known by the media. 
The Russian public was also alarmed by the high non-combat death and suicide rates, often a result 
of bullying and hazing known as dedovshchina. All these factors together led to a decline in public 
trust towards the military, making also conscription highly unpopular. (Zhel'vis 2011: 231; Lokshin 
and  Yemtsov 2005:  1;  Petrov  2003:  294;  Eichler  2012).  In  addition,  the  breakdown of  Soviet 
authoritarianism and  the  promise  of  social  change  and  democracy made  it  possible  to  contest 
obligatory military service (Eichler 2012).
Whereas about 30 years ago, 90% of draft-aged youngsters reported that they were eager to join the 
army, now the numbers have literally turned upside down, as 80% expresses reluctance to serve 
(Serebryannikov 1999:  44).  Today,  the  majority  of  Russians  regard  conscript  soldiers  first  and 
foremost  free  as  labour  force  for  the  state  (Mikhailenok  2006),  and  some compare  obligatory 
military service to serfdom25. This drastic change in attitudes manifests also in the growing number 
of  men trying  to  avoid service26 (Lokhshin & Yemtsov 2005:  6;  Serebryannikov 1999:  44).  In 
theory, all Russian men between 18 and 27 are still required to serve in the country's armed forces. 
In practice, however, only a small minority of those eligible for service, about 10 %, fulfil their 
constitutional duty (Gudkov 2006: 42;  Mikhailenok 2006: 115). Draft-avoidance has become so 
commonplace  that,  according  to  an  independent  military  expert  Pavel  Felgenhauer,  the  whole 
conscription institution is about to collapse27.
23 This was the same time when the Soldiers' Mothers movement was started (Eichler 2012: 85).
24 Scandals have continued to date, and for example, news about undernourished soldiers are regular.
25 http://www.mk.ru/print/articles/520932-novoe-krepostnoe-pravo.html  
26 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1094351.html  
27 http://news.mail.ru/politics/4019042/  
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Even though conscription affects the lives of hundreds of thousands of young Russian men twice 
every year, there are neither frequent nor visible protests to it. For example, a demonstration for 
voluntary military service held in Moscow in 2007 managed to mobilize only about a hundred 
people28.
Recruiting the poor and the sick
The rapid decline in the number of conscripts results partly from the loosened draft regulations 
(Lokhshin & Yemtsov 2005: 6). Another factor contributing to the manning problems in the military 
is the challenging demographic situation in the country. Russia's population declines every year by 
about 700,000 (Sakwa 2008: 315). The birthrates started to fall in the end of the 1980s and were 
especially low in the beginning of the 1990s. As a consequence, there are less potential recruits 
available today.29
Since filling the annual draft quotas has become increasingly challenging, the military recruitment 
offices have gained bad reputation for their illegal recruitment practices. Physically unfit and ill 
youngster who should have been granted exemption, students with deferments, and even foreigners 
have been forced to serve30. (Lokhshin & Yemtsov 2005: 6- 7). According to Webber & Zilbermann 
(2006: 117), “[s]uch behaviour on the part of the military institution displays the characteristics 
associated with an authoritarian State, rather than a liberal democracy”. The military has also been 
criticised for recruiting ex-convicts in growing numbers (Zhel'vis 2011: 232).
Further, the problem of manning is not only a question of quantity, but also of quality31. Even as 
many as 59% of Russia's population live in poverty32, a fact that manifests itself in conscripts' poor 
health (Klement'ev & Nikolaeva 2000: 72). Many suffer from chronic diseases (Peven' 1997: 22). 
The average height among conscripts is 1,6-1,7 meters, and the majority weighs only around 50 kg, 
whereas the ideal numbers would be 1,8 meters and 63 to 74 kg33. The Committee of the Soldiers' 
Mothers claims that ”95 per cent of conscripts are sick in some degree”, and therefore not fit for 
service34. Moreover, alcohol and drug abuse are alarmingly usual (Peven' 1997: 22), and 30% of 
28 http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2007/09/29/n_1123346.shtml  
29 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1888238,00.html  , http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1094351.html
30 http://www.mk.ru/print/articles/589410-menyaem-armiyu-na-zagranitsu.html  ,
     http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Military_Concerned_With_Evasion_As_Army_Draft_Begins/2176960.html
31 See e.g. http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=12226
32 http://www.rosbalt.ru/blogs/2012/01/11/932127.html  
33 http://www.aif.ru/article/print/article_id/40987  
34 http://www.gzt.ru/print/352413.html  
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draftees suffer from mental illnesses35.
As the above mentioned figures testify, ”the burden of conscription falls disproportionately on the 
poor” (Lokshin & Yemtsov 2005: 1). Around 80% of conscripts come from the countryside or small 
towns36 and from poor, low-educated working class or rural families. Only about 4 to 6% of draftees 
are  from  the  two  main  cities,  Moscow37 and  St.  Petersburg,  and  merely  16,8%  have  higher 
education38. Young men with middle class background or from elite families, who would be the 
healthiest and most fit for service, are the ones who are most successful in avoiding it 39. (ibid.; 
Mikhailenok 2006: 119; Peven' 1997: 21-22).
Hence, the conscription system both reflects and deepens the stratification of Russian society, the 
gap between the rich and the poor, the haves and have-nots (Mikhailenok 2006: 124-125; Petrov 
2003: 296). Those, who are better-off, can afford to use one of the many methods to avoid the draft, 
”shifting  the  burden to  the  poor”  (Lokshin  & Yemtsov  2005:  3;  Mikhailenok 2006;  124-125). 
Mikhailenok (ibid.: 114, 116) claims that instead of working as a 'social lift' like the Soviet army, 
today's Russian military has turned into an institution of social outsiderness that gathers those who 
do  not  have  the  right  social  networks  or  financial  resources  to  buy  themselves  off.  Further, 
coinciding with “critical years of entry into the labour”, military service “distorts working histories 
possibly leading to some losses of incomes over the entire work-life horizon” (Lokshin & Yemtsov 
2005: 9-10).
In the Soviet period, military service was a male rite of passage. Today, however, the process of  
solving the question of how to avoid the army marks the entrance into adulthood for many young 
Russians40. Serebryannikov (1999: 44) claims that 'dodging the draft' has become an admired thing 
to  do  among  youth.  A young  man  showing  eagerness  to  serve  can  be  regarded  as  a  strange 
exception41. Nevertheless, in the rural areas, military service continues to be considered prestigious, 
and many young men are eager to serve. After completing compulsory service, many decide to 
continue working on contract basis. Thus, for some, the army can still mean new life prospects.42 
35 http://news.mail.ru/society/1801261/  
36 http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/224476  
37 Every third draft-avoider lives in Moscow: http://www.ng.ru/printed/23933.
38 http://www.vz.ru/society/2010/7/26/420812.html  
39 Kay (2006: 54) quotes a Russian military recruitment officer in her study: ”The problem is that lots of the young men who really 
are fit both physically and mentally do go on into higher education and beyond into postgraduate studies. So we really have to 
fight for every single fit conscript that we can get.”
40 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/10/world/europe/10iht-russia.html  
41 http://arh.mk.ru/print/articles/595556-god-sluzhi-vek-uchis.html  
42 http://www.ng.ru/printed/77601  
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According to a survey, 35% of conscripts served against their will, and 40% were not pleased with 
their service period43. In other words, there are still many young men in Russia who are willing to 
go to the army, find it not that bad an experience and decide to tie their future to the armed forces.
The problem of violence in the military: Dedovshchina
If in the Soviet times the military offered ”idealized images of masculinity, manly comradeship and 
friendship”44 (Kon 2002: 232), the situation today is quite different. One of the biggest plagues that 
the Russian military struggles with is  dedovshchina, cruel harassment and violence against junior 
conscripts45.  It  is  one  of  the  main  factors  contributing  to  young  men's  aversion  to  the  army46 
(Zhel'vis 2011: 232; Novik & Perednya 2006: 103).
Moreover, dedovshchina is frequently the reason behind desertion cases, which have also been on 
the increase47 (Mikhailenok 2006: 115), and, even more sadly, the high non-combat  casualty and 
suicide statistics in the Russian army. According to the Committee of the Soldier's Mothers, there 
are on average  2000 deaths per year in the Russian military, one fourth of which are suicides.48 
Malnutrition among soldiers is also often connected to  dedovshchina: seniors often demand new 
conscripts to give up their food rations.49
However, the representatives of the army have played down the issue, and claim that the problem is  
not widespread. The military has tried to avoid responsibility, for example, by suggesting that the 
'roots of dedovshchina' can be found in the homes and environment today's young men grown up in, 
not in the army itself. Moreover, it has blamed the media for reporting only about incidents that put 
the armed forces in an unfavourable light,  and thereby fostering the prevalent negative opinion 
about the army and draft avoidance.50
43 http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/224476  
44 My translation
45 http://www.barentsobserver.com/en/sections/security/soldier-beaten-healthless-pechenga
One of the most famous examples that shocked Russians in 2006, was the case of conscript Andrey Sychev, whose legs and 
genitals had to be amputated as a result of dedovshchina (see e.g. http://rian.ru/analytics/20060127/43220027.html)
46 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1094351.html  
47 http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=25023  
48 http://www.gzt.ru/print/352413.html  , http://www.networkeurope.org/feature/draft-dodging-russian-style, 
http://www.vz.ru/news/2006/2/27/24029.html
49 http://news.mail.ru/inregions/fareast/25/5919780/  , http://www.newizv.ru/society/2003-11-13/2756-armija-golodnyh.html
50 http://rian.ru/society/20041215/760818.html  , http://kp.ru/daily/25681/841024/. About the difficult relations between the media 
and the army, see e.g. Renz's study (2006).
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2.3 Avoiding the draft
Playing by the draft rules
How to avoid military service is an openly discussed topic in Russia, and the many ways to go 
about it,  both legal and illegal, are commonly known51.  Avoiding the draft does not necessarily 
imply  illegal  means. According  to  law,  military  service  can  be  postponed  due  to  family 
circumstances. These include: having a family member who requires nursing, being legal guardian 
to one's sibling, being a single parent, having one or more children or a child who is disabled, or 
having a spouse who is pregnant. Furthermore, deferment can be obtained for a variety of health 
reasons. Also enrolment in full-time education and employment in the public sector entitle to a 
postponement.52
As many as  80  per  cent  of  those,  who  are  called  up  and  appear  at  draft  station, are  granted 
exemption or deferment53. However, it is often difficult or even impossible to tell whether a young 
man simply happened to,  or whether  he actually did everything in order  to  fit  into one  of the 
exemption or deferment categories. For example, many times academic ambitions are a secondary 
motivator for enrolment in postgraduate studies. In order to obtain deferments, fictive marriages are 
also arranged, while some decide to start a family at a young age merely to avoid being drafted54. 
Others  try to imitate  chronic diseases55.  Some young men even prefer  a  white  chit56 to  call-up 
papers, even though it means they will never be able to get a job in state institutions57.
In order to avoid being drafted, young Russian men are also ready to take extreme measures. Some 
find a way to leave the country and stay abroad until they turn 27.58 For others, committing a crime 
and serving time in jail  is a more attractive option than doing military service59.  Moreover, the 
question  about  military  service  and  how  to  avoid  it  affects  many  times  not  only  young  men 
themselves, but also their families60. Mothers are often ready to do everything for their sons to avoid 
call-up61. I was, for instance, told by a Russian lady that the main reason for her remarrying and 
51 http://www.dv.kp.ru/daily/25682/841495/  
52 http://pravomer.info/  , www.soldiers-mothers-rus.ru/
53 http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/12/29/in-russia-the-favorite-pastime-of-draft-dodging  
54 http://www.trud.ru/article/25-10-2007/213653_zhenilsja_na_starushke_i_izbezhal_prizyva_v_armiju.html  
55 http://news.mail.ru/politics/1539342/  
56 In Russian, belyi bilet. Grants exemption due to mental disease.
57 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1888238,00.html   
58 http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20101013/160942293.html  
59 http://news.mail.ru/inregions/siberian/42/2933175/  , http://news.mail.ru/incident/2176955/
60 The topic has been discussed also in the Russian cinema. The movie Elena (2011) examines the dilemma of how far the main 
character is ready to go in order to save her grandson from military service. In the end, she commits a murder to obtain the 
money needed for buying him off.
61 http://www.pressmon.com/cgi-bin/press_view.cgi?id=1225447  
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moving abroad with her son was that she wanted to secure that he would not have to serve in the 
military in Russia.
Hide-and-seek with voenkomat
In Russia, the call-up is organized biannually, in spring and autumn. Each region, city and district  
has its own draft quota. According to legislation,  draft-avoidance becomes punishable only if  a 
draftee has personally received his call-up papers but fails to show up draft station (Eichler 2012: 
61). Hence, many take advantage of the draft system itself and simply make sure they are not at 
home  during  the  spring  and  autumn  drafts  when  military  officials  deliver  call-up  papers  to 
registered addresses.62 The estimated amount of young men who every year evades the draft in this 
way  vary  from 100  000  to  over  200  000,  and  the  number  is  growing63 (Zhel'vis  2011:  231; 
Klement'ev & Nikolaeva 2000: 72). The state being too weak and inefficient to control the situation, 
most of them manage to avoid military service (Caiazza 2002: 108), but some do get caught for 
'draft-dodging'64. Punishments vary from fines to up to two years in jail. In most cases, those found 
guilty pay a penalty, but every year also 800 to 1000 young men have to serve time in jail for illegal 
draft-avoidance.65
Corruption
Often,  draft-avoidance  involves  indisputably illegal  actions.  Corruption  forms  one  of  the  most 
pressing problems in the Russian military in general, and the number of scandals has only been on 
the rise during the past years66. Also conscription has become a ”system ridden by corruption” 
(Lokhshin & Yemtsov 2005: 1), and news, for example, about military personnel selling exemption 
certificates are not a rarity67. Moreover, the conscription system feeds corruption also outside the 
military. Resorting to falsified documents is a common way out from military duty. For a significant 
financial  compensation,  some doctors are also ready to issue medical certificates that declare a 
draftee unfit for service68, and fictive educational institutions provide young men student status that 
guarantees deferment69.
62 http://news.mail.ru/politics/1539342/  
63 http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Military_Concerned_With_Evasion_As_Army_Draft_Begins/2176960.html  , 
http://www.trud.ru/article/02-02-2010/235892_zhestkie_mery_dlja_uklonistov.html, http://news.mail.ru/politics/4166523/, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/news/social/2010/02/02/n_1452031.shtml, http://www.moscownews.ru/russia/20120328/189570351.html
64 http://news.mail.ru/incident/1778032/  , http://news.mail.ru/incident/1798491/
65 http://www.trud.ru/article/02-02-2010/235892_zhestkie_mery_dlja_uklonistov.html  , http://news.mail.ru/politics/4166523/
66 http://www.aif.ru/sport/news/36196  , http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/distrikt/troms_og_finnmark/1.7952713, 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/corruption-military-cosmic-proportions, http://barentsobserver.com/en/node/20927
67 http://vz.ru/society/2009/4/21/278604.html  , http://news.mail.ru/incident/1881047/
68 http://news.mail.ru/inregions/ural/86/4009601/  , http://ivanovo.mk.ru/print/articles/585127-novoe-delo-vrachey.html, 
http://www.aif.ru/health/news/26125
69 http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20101013/160942293.html  
18
Bribery, as a way to avoid military service, has in fact become so widespread and commonly known 
that in 2010 a bill legalizing 'buying oneself off' was presented in the Duma, the lower chamber of 
the Russian parliament. The proposed price for not having to serve was one million rubles and the 
money collected would have been used to professionalize the army.70 However, the law proposal 
was rejected. Neither did it receive popular support: according to a survey, two thirds of Russians 
objected the idea and thought it would only deepen social inequality71.
2.4 Reforms and prospects for the future
Length of service
As an answer to the worsening recruitment situation in the armed forces, the Russian government 
decided to reduce the length of compulsory military service, first to one and a half years in 2007, 
and  then  down  to  one  year  as  of  2008.  These  changes  were  thought  to  make  serving  more 
appealing. They were also hoped to solve the problem of dedovshchina, which was seen first and 
foremost as an issue of misuse of senior position by those who were serving their second year. At 
first,  the  incentive  did  seem to  work,  as  the  amount  of  young  men  listing  for  service  grew72. 
However, reducing the service time without cutting down the overall number of men in the armed 
forces meant that, in practice, more draftees were needed now. For example, in Leningradskaya 
oblast', the region surrounding the city of Saint Petersburg, the draft plan almost tripled compared to 
what it had been before 200873. Hence, the manning problem remained or even worsened in some 
cases.  What  comes  to  dedovshchina,  some  claim  that  the  situation  has  merely  exacerbated74. 
According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, officers have now started to take the role of the 
'older' bully more frequently75.
Alternative service
Since  1993,  the  constitution  of  the  Russian  Federation  has  guaranteed  a  right  to  conscientious 
objection76 (Horeman & Stolwijk 1998: 240; Sakwa 2008: 406). However, it was not until 2004 that 
the right was enshrined in actual legislation and conscripts could apply for alternative non-military 
70 http://www.rg.ru/2010/06/08/otkup.html  
71 http://www.mk.ru/print/articles/516777-ot-rodinyi-ne-otkupishsya.html  
72 http://news.mail.ru/inregions/st_petersburg/91/3672636/  , http://news.mail.ru/society/1682732/, http://www.trud.ru/article/02-04-
2007/204223_sokraschenie_sroka_sluzhby_v_armii--sposob_borby_s/print
73 http://news.mail.ru/inregions/st_petersburg/91/2474348/  
74 http://www.mk.ru/print/articles/520932-novoe-krepostnoe-pravo.html  
75 http://www.gzt.ru/print/352413.html  
76 Article 59.3. According to Coppieters (1992), the right to conscientious objection can be regarded as a question of political 
tolerance, and ”freedom of thought, conscience and religion”.
19
service. The law on alternative military service defined religious convictions and pacifism as legally 
approved grounds for refusal to bear arms77. However, according to Sakwa (ibid.), it also ”faithfully 
reflected the concerns of the military”, and many consider it a punishment already because of the 
length of the service – 42 or 41 months78. The amount of applicants has been only some hundreds 
every year, and most of them refer to religious grounds79. Thus, the widespread unwillingness to 
serve in the armed forces has not been channelled into alternative service,  nor is  that likely to 
happen in the future.
Attempts to keep the conscription system alive
Further, in order to increase the amount of draftees, the number of deferment categories has been 
cut down several times80 (Sakwa 2008: 406). According to the latest information, conscription laws 
might be further tightened in order to make evading the draft impossible. The bill ”would make all 
eligible  men between the ages  of  18 and 27 obliged to  collect  their  summons in  person or be 
considered a draft dodger”81. The government hopes that these measures will help to put an end to 
the army's recruitment difficulties. Furthermore, thousands of women already serve in the armed 
forces on contract basis. Recently, it has been suggested that military duty should be extended to 
women, too82.
Following the example set by countries like the USA, France and Germany, the Russian leadership 
has  promised  transition  to  a  professional  army and to  abolish  conscription  (Petrov  2003:  293; 
Sakwa 2008:  405;  Eichler  2012).  However,  the  reforms seem to  take  painfully  long83.  For  the 
moment, the armed forces cannot afford to increase the number of soldiers recruited on voluntary 
(contract) basis84, and according to former president Dmitrii Medvedev's announcement, the army 
will  continue to rely on conscription to  fill  the ranks at  least  the next  10 to 15 years 85.  In the 
meanwhile, the government is doing everything to keep the conscription system alive.
In the government's view, the underlying reason for young Russians' growing unwillingness to serve 
in the military is the post-Soviet generations' lack of patriotism. Hence, it has tried to tackle the 
77 http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=103351  , http://www.gzt.ru/topnews/world/-spravka-o-patsifizme-/11738.html
78 http://rian.ru/analytics/20051010/41654816.html  
79 http://www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/-aljternativnyi-grazhdanskii-srok-/95215.html  
80 http://www.businesspress.ru/newspaper/article_mId_40_aId_378115.html  
81 http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120328/172440775.html  
82 www.rusnovosti.ru/news/238181  
83 In 1996, Boris Yeltsin set the year 2000 as the goal when conscription would be abolished (Horeman & Stolwijk 1998: 239).
84 http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20101013/160942293.html  , http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_03_31/70249693/
85 http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110404/163367728.html  
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perceived problem through a state program called ”Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian 
Federation”86 (Nikonova 2010: 354; Sperling 2009: 218). Putin has underlined military service as a 
male duty, and according to Eichler (2012), the state leadership aims at ”re-establishing a strong 
link between masculinity, military service, and patriotism”.
Further,  the  patriotic  education  programs have  sought  to  construct  ”continuity between Tsarist, 
Soviet, and post-Soviet periods” with a particular focus on military victories, especially the Great 
Patriotic War87 (Blum 2006: 2; Sperling 2009: 218-234; Sperling 2003: 236-241). Putin has been 
keen to emphasize the positive meaning of the Soviet past for today's Russia (Pirani 2009: 126-127;  
Arutyunova 2007: 82). The war of 1941-1945 is regarded as a connecting link between the Soviet 
and the post-Soviet, and emphasizing the heroism of the veterans is thought to motivate younger 
generations to serve (Shaburova 2005: 88-89; Arutyunova 2007: 82). Only time will show if the 
programs will manage to solve the problem of growing military service avoidance and save the 
conscription  institution.  So  far,  the  Russian  public  has  shown  resistance  to  the  government's 
attempts to (re-)militarise the society (Webber & Zilberman 2006: 196; Sperling 2009). According 
to Eichler (2006: 499), ”[w]hile militarized patriotism has gained currency at the level of political 
rhetoric,  this  is  not  mirrored at  the level  of  individual  men,  many of  whom continue to  avoid 
military service”.
2.5 Summary
This  chapter  has  sought  to  outline  the  context  of  the  study.  It  has  focused  on  the  history  of 
conscription in Russia, especially the Soviet period, as well as the problems that the institution is 
struggling  with  today.  A special  focus  has  been  given  on  the  contemporary  issues  of  draft-
avoidance. In the Soviet era, the mass army and compulsory military service were the government's 
main tools in consolidating the communist ideology and exercising control over the population. 
They were also the key means for building and asserting the country's power internationally. The 
conscription system was not merely maintained through coercion; myths and gender notions that 
promoted military service as a citizenship duty, necessary male rite of passage and 'school of life' 
were equally important.
Since the late-Soviet period, draft avoidance has, however, been growing rapidly. Due to violence 
86 So far, the program has been adopted three times for the periods of 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015. For an interesting 
analysis of the government's patriotic education programmes and (re)militarisation of the Russian public, see Sperling (2009).
87 In Russia, the World War II, after Germany started its attack on the Soviet Union in July 1941, is also known as the Great 
Patriotic War. Of all the countries involved in the WWII, the USSR faced the greatest losses – according to the highest 
estimations, 27 million Soviet citizens died (Vihavainen 2008: 306).
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and abuse of conscripts, both young men and their parents have legitimate reasons for being afraid 
of the consequences of the now one-year obligatory service. Some resort to illegalities, but many 
youngsters manage to avoid service by exploiting discrepancies in the legislation. Especially well-
to-do  families  arrange  their  sons  free  from the  military  duty,  something  which  is  turning  the 
contemporary armed forces into peasant and worker boys' weak and sick army (Zhel'vis 2011). The 
army's manning difficulties have caused increasing unease in the current state leadership and it has 
tried to solve the problem by resorting to old remedies; the attempts to construct military service as 
a  gender  practice  and  promote  militarized  patriotism  are  reminiscent  of  the  Soviet  period. 
According to Webber & Zilberman (2006:  175-176),  ”[t]he state-level and military institutional 
rhetoric on conscription has hardly changed since Soviet times: young men are still exhorted to do 
their patriotic duty [and asserted] that by doing so they will become 'real men'”. However, society 
has changed radically since the disintegration of the USSR and the likelyhood for the old strategy 
and call for militarised patriotism to work in the new reality is little.  According to  Webber and 
Zilberman (2006: 180-181), the government's expectation that the citizens ”will dutifully oblige” 
any demand it makes ”is completely out of touch with the nature of Russian society today”.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
This chapter focuses on methodological issues, especially the choice of study area, data collection 
technique and informants. It also looks at the field decisions with emphasis on the strengths and 
limitations of the chosen data collection strategy. I also reflect upon my own role as a fieldworker, 
as my social attributes – in particular gender, local language proficiency, age and nationality – are 
likely to have influenced the data collection process and its outcomes.
3.1 Study area
Saint Petersburg, situated in the Northwest of the Russian Federation, at the head of the Gulf of 
Finland, was chosen to be the study area. With almost 5 million inhabitants and position as a federal 
subject,  St.  Petersburg88 is  Russia's  second  largest  and  important  city  after  Moscow89. 
Peterburzhtsy90 themselves like to emphasize their hometown's role as the cultural and intellectual 
capital  of the country (Parland 2003: 27).  Only a small  minority of all  draftees come from St. 
Petersburg and Moscow91 (also Mikhailenok 2006: 119). Hence, St. Petersburg offers an excellent 
example of a place where avoiding the draft  has become a wide-spread practice among young 
men92.
In the Soviet planned economy, Leningrad was an important industrial center focusing mainly on 
shipbuilding, electrotechnology and war industry. After the break-up of the USSR, radical structural 
changes have taken place in the city. Massive cuts in the defence budget meant that, in the new 
context of market capitalism, other sources of income had to be created. This has led to growth in 
the service sector, food industry and retail sales, among others. (Helanterä & Tynkkynen 2002: 42-
43). Like the whole country, the city has and is still going through economic and social transition 
processes.  The  post-Soviet  reality  has  opened  to  both  new possibilities  as  well  as  challenges: 
”[Y]ounger  generations  are  coping  admirably  with  the  economic  changes,  but  unemployment 
remains high and families and pensioners struggle desperately to make ends meet”.93
88 St. Petersburg was founded in 1703.  Until 1918,  it was also the capital of the Russian Empire. Between 1914 and 1924, St. 
Petersburg was called Petrograd; in 1924, it was named Leningrad. The original name St. Petersburg was re turned in 1991, after 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. (http://gov.spb.ru/).
89 http://gov.spb.ru/  
90 Residents of St. Petersburg
91 http://www.ng.ru/printed/23933  
92 Moreover, one practical matter guided the choice of study area: I was accepted for a summer internship position in two St.  
Petersburg-based NGOs, Side by Side LGBT International Film Festival and Coming Out St. Petersburg LGBT Organization.
93 www.Saint-Petersburg.com  
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Life in today's St. Petersburg's is characterized by processes of cultural and economic globalization 
to a much greater extent than in many other parts of the Russian Federation. After the fall of the  
Iron Curtain, the city has regained its position as both Russia's gate to Europe and Europe's gate to 
Russia. Many international corporations have established their offices in St. Petersburg in order to 
access  the  Russian  domestic  market  (Helanterä  &  Tynkkynen  2002:  105).  Moreover,  the  city 
promotes itself actively as a tourist destination and has almost five million visitors yearly, of which 
half are foreigners94. The great majority of both leisure and business travellers are from Finland – 
Germany  and  the  USA come  second  and  third95.  Neither  are  the  residents  of  St.  Petersburg 
themselves any less eager to travel abroad. For example in 2011, the Consulate-General of Finland 
in St. Petersburg processed almost one million Schengen visa applications96.  As a consequence, 
many like to joke that the whole city has a Finnish visa97.
Choosing study area is also about choosing perspective. Peripheries and centers always represent 
two different realities. According to Aitamurto, Jäppinen & Kulmala (2010: 31), the gap between 
the two is more pronounced in Russia than in many other countries. Further, research about Russia 
has  been  criticized  for  being  geographically  too  much  focused  on  the  power  centers  on  the 
European side of the country (ibid.: 30-31), and that can be seen as one of the weaknesses of this 
study,  too98.  One the  one  hand,  considering  how widespread draft-avoidance  is  in  the  city,  St.  
Petersburg provides a highly relevant context for the study. On the other hand, by exploring other 
perspectives this study could have gained different and perhaps richer insights into life in Russia. 
After all, the majority of Russians does not live in an international and ”modern, rapidly growing 
commercial city” like the country's second capital99.
Further,  nicknamed  as  'Russia's  window  to  the  West' (Helanterä  &  Tynkkynen  2002:  42),  St. 
Petersburg is often described as Russia's most European city, which for many people means that it is 
not 'real' Russia. Statements like that seem to presuppose that 'Russianness' is an objective, essential 
and rather one-dimensional quality that a person or place has or does not have. However, my point 
94 St. Petersburg is often described as a ”cultural-historically unique Northern metropolis” (Helanterä & Tynkkynen 2002: 105). The  
historical center is world-famous for its architecture, numerous palaces and museums which have earned the city a place on the  
UNESCO world heritage list. Located on several islands in the delta of the Neva River and characterized by its many channels, it  
also holds the nickname Northern Venice. (See http://gov.spb.ru/).
95 http://gov.spb.ru/
96 http://www.finland.org.ru/public/default.aspx?contentid=237997&culture=fi-FI  
97 During the past few years, Russian tourism to Finland has been breaking one record after another, turning some small Finnish  
border towns like Lappeenranta into shopping centers for Russian tourists. St. Petersburg is located about 130 km from the 
Finnish border.
98 Before setting off for St. Petersburg, my initial plan was to collect data also in other cities, and I had already established contacts  
in Archangel and Murmansk. However, my full-time internship tied me to St. Petersburg and I did not get a chance to leave the  
city for additional fieldwork.
99 www.Saint-Petersburg.com  
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of view is that Russia consists of a plurality of realities, and St. Petersburg – unique and 'real' in its  
own ways – represents one of them. Trying to explain Russia as a whole is, in fact, impossible: all 
we can try to do is to understand parts of the whole (Aitamurto, Jäppinen & Kulmala 2010: 31)100. 
That is the premise also my study is based on.
3.2 Choosing a data collection technique: Fieldwork
De-emphasizing macro perspective
Studies  on  Russia  have  every  now  and  then  been  criticized  for  relying  too  much  on  official 
documents as data sources, thereby reproducing the viewpoints of officialdom, power elites and 
privileging a macro level analysis. After all, they represent only one, limited perspective into the 
contemporary Russian reality (Aitamurto, Jäppinen & Kulmala 2010: 30-31). In Russia – a country 
of high power distance101, characterized by hierarchy, autocratic and paternalistic power relations, 
and a very pronounced gap between the ruling elite and ordinary people102 – it is very common to 
hear people say that the state authorities and society lead two different lives separate from each 
other. For example, the official, political discourse might embrace military values but the press and 
society  show  much  more  critical  attitudes  towards  the  army  and  military  service  (Webber  & 
Zilberman 2006: 160-161)103.
Thus, the choice of data collection method boils eventually down to the question about choosing 
what perspective(s) one wishes to highlight or privilege in the study. From the start of this project, 
my research interest  has been in exploring and understanding the micro perspective of military 
service avoidance, that is, the viewpoints of ordinary young Russian men. The aim of this study is  
to emphasize how the young men themselves understand and explain the phenomenon of draft-
avoidance and how they as social agents reflect, experience, manage and negotiate social life (see 
Bryman 2008: 438).
100 Haraway (1988: 590): ”The only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in particular.”
101 Parikka (2008) has applied Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory on Russia. According to Hofstede (1991: 38), ”[i]n the large  
power distance situation power is seen as a basic fact of society which precedes the choice between good and evil. Its legitimacy  
is irrelevant. Might prevails over right.” A recent concrete example of high power distance was the way the current Russian 
leadership ignored the historically large protest  waves demanding fair  elections in autumn 2011 and spring 2012 and even  
ridiculed the participants.
102 According to Saari (2011: 3), the political's elite's alienation from society is only deepening in Russia.
103 Vladimir Putin has been accused of (re-)militarizing Russia through, for example, the Patriotic Education Programs. However, in  
order for any government policies to succeed, society needs to be responsive to them. In the Soviet Union, basic military training 
was a compulsory part of school curriculum. However, it did not not prevent pupils from making fun of and ridiculing the classes  
and teachers who taught the subject. (Webber & Zilbermann 2006). Even if the political system discourages public discussion and 
open critique, it does not mean that people do not challenge and question the practices and ideas the government imposes on  
them.
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Every study dictates its data collection technique. Kulmala & Saarinen (2010: 11-12), for example, 
recommend fieldwork if one seeks to gain insight into the lives of ordinary Russians and adopt 'a 
view from below' (see also Pilkington 1996: 4). Military service avoidance could have been studied 
from already existing written sources. However, I found the option problematic because, as Caiazza 
(2002) points out, in Russia ”the young male citizens most directly affected by military service 
policy [are] largely absent from political discussions about it”.  This study aims at obtaining  first-
hand  knowledge  from the  draft-avoiders  themselves,  not  information  and  viewpoints  mediated 
through, for example, an organization or the press. After all, it is the young men who form ”an 
unconscious social movement” that has already affected Russia's military policy and the army as an 
institution (Webber & Zilberman 2006: 188).
3.3 Informants
Informant selection
According to Rubin & Rubin (2005: 64-65), informants ”should be experienced and knowledgeable 
in  the [research]  area” and on the research issues.  In the current  situation,  where only a small 
minority of those eligible for military service go to the army, a large part of young Russian men can 
be  said  to  have  ”relevant,  first-hand  experience”  (ibid.:  65)  from  military  service  avoidance. 
Because the aim was to reach so-called ordinary young men and at the same time obtain as variable 
data as possible, I kept the criteria for recruitment of informants simple: the interviewee had to be 
someone who had not done military service, and wished to avoid it. This way I hoped to be able to  
get in contact with young Russians with different backgrounds, perspectives and aspirations.
Number of informants
As I set off for fieldwork, I hoped to get about ten informants; by the end of the field period, I had 
reached eight104. Obviously, a study based on such a small amount of informants does not produce a 
statistically representative sample. However, that is not even the purpose of this or any qualitative 
study. As Kvale (1996: 33) notes, in qualitative research ”[i]t is not general opinions that are asked 
for”. Rather, qualitative studies usually have a limited number of research participants because in 
that way,  it  is  easier  to  guarantee that  differences between them are not  lost  in generalizations 
(Oinas 2004: 216, 219). In other words, small number of informants can be an advantage: it allows 
the researcher to give space to the diversity and richness of the data, and focus on particularities. 
104 The challenges that I faced in finding research participants will be discussed later in this chapter.
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This exactly has been the aim of the present study. I was satisfied with the quality of the field 
materials, and felt that the main goal – to get good and in-depth data  – had been reached. Despite 
the small number of informants, also data saturation started to become obvious towards the end of 
the fieldwork, as certain patterns and themes stood out from the material. As one of the research 
participants pointed out, it should not be a surprise that people who are products of the same time 
and same culture think similarly and say similar things. Furthermore, one young Russian man living 
in Tromsø offered to participate in the study in 2012. Hence, the total amount of informants became 
nine.
Gaining access
Many  scholars  underline  the  significance  of  personal  relations  for  operating  and  successfully 
conducting research in the Russian context: access is often granted only if one is introduced by 
someone already inside the community, especially in the case of potentially sensitive research topics 
(Aitamurto,  Jäppinen  &  Kulmala  2010:  34-35;  Salmenniemi  &  Rotkirch  2008).  According  to 
Eichler  (2012),  ”[f]or  Russian  men  (whether  sons  or  fathers)  to  publicly  speak  out  against 
conscription is  socially less  acceptable  and likely to  be seen as  unmanly”.  However,  from my 
previous stays in Russia I had the impression that most people were comfortable and even eager to 
talk  about  military  service  avoidance  in  a  private  setting.  Taking  the  prevailing  situation  into 
account, I considered that the best way to approach potential informants would be through common 
acquaintances and friends.
Researchers often make use of their social networks in order to find and gain access to informants 
(Rubin & Rubin 2005: 89). Applying this strategy turned out to have its advantages for my project, 
too. Firstly, there is always a power aspect to any research, and it is the researcher who holds a 
stronger  position  in  relation  to  the  informant  (Oinas  2004:  222),  which  can  cause  discomfort.  
However, I believe that having my project and myself introduced to the informants by someone we 
both knew, and in an informal way, helped to diminish the feeling of hierarchy. My impression was 
that most of the research participants regarded me as their peer – we were, after all, more or less of 
the same age, young adults in more or less similar life situations, between studies and working life. 
Secondly, since draft-avoidance can potentially lead to legal consequences, it was crucial also in 
regard to security that the informants could trust me as a person and the motives of the research105. 
According to Liamputtong (2008: 9),  ”[o]ften, potential  research participants want to identify a 
105 At the beginning of every interview, I also told the informant that I needed not to know and would not write about how they had 
managed to avoid service but was interested in finding out why they had wished not to go to the military.
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common person whom they themselves and the researcher know as a way for them to check the 
researcher’s credibility and trustworthiness”.  Thus, having the initial contact facilitated by a third 
party was useful.
Nevertheless, finding research participants was to some extent challenging: everyone I contacted 
agreed at first but many were never able to find the time, or simply stopped replying. It can only be 
speculated whether they really were busy or just unwilling to talk about the topic with me. A friend 
of mine from a provincial town was convinced that the latter was the correct answer and wondered 
if I would manage to find any interviewees at all. In her opinion, not having been to the army was  
so shameful that no one would want to be open about it. However, if the topic is sensitive or not 
probably  varies  from person  to  person.  My own  experience  was  that  I  was  surprised  by  the 
informants' openness. Moreover, they were convinced they had done nothing wrong and one of the 
research participants even stated boldly that there was no need to close the door to the hallway: in 
his view, he had nothing to hide and was prepared to share his opinions about conscription  and 
military service with the whole world.
Furthermore, recruiting research participants through social networks can be a problematic method 
because it may lead to little variation. Even though the  present informants do not form one big 
network  where  everyone  knows  each  other,  they  are  nevertheless  in  many  ways  quite  a 
homogeneous  group,  a  fact  which  again reflects  the  limitedness  of  my  contact  network.  The 
homogeneity is  visible,  for  example,  in  the  participants'  educational  backgrounds: the  with the 
exception of  two informants, all were enrolled in or had completed higher education. Informants 
with other backgrounds would have had different stories to tell and viewpoints to share. However, 
one study can never present and represent all the possible sides of a phenomenon.
3.4 Interviewing
If you want to know how people understand their world and their life, why not talk with them? (Kvale 1996: 1)
Qualitative interview as data collection method
This study is interested in  Russian  draft-avoiders'  ”interpretations of their experiences and their 
understanding of the world in which they live” (Rubin & Rubin 2005: 36). These are all aspects that 
need to be verbally articulated in order to be  conveyed to and made understandable for others. 
Hence, fieldwork and data collection in the form of ethnography and participant observation did not 
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seem suitable. As Bryman (2008: 466), puts it: ”[T]here are issues that are resistant to observation”. 
Instead, I found qualitative interviewing better suited to  the study. Qualitative interview is an in-
depth method that can grant access to deep  knowledge and explanations, and help to ”grasp the 
subject's perspective” (Corbetta 2003: 264; also Kvale 1996: 1). Through face-to-face discussions a 
subjective, unique, detailed and personal story can be told, and the focus is on how the interviewee 
understands and explains different phenomena, the world and his/her actions in it (Bryman 2008: 
438).  In other words, qualitative interview is an appropriate method for project that seeks to shed 
light on experiences, perceptions and meanings of a particular social group. Hence, it was chosen to 
be the primary data collection method in this study.
Conducting interviews
The interviews were conducted in St. Petersburg during August and September 2011; one interview 
was conducted in Tromsø in 2012, after the actual fieldwork period. All the nine informants were 
interviewed once. The interviews averaged an hour, with the shortest being half an hour and the 
longest one and a half hours. All of them were tape-recorded. Five of the interviews were conducted 
at the Center for Independent Social Research106, located in the city center of St. Petersburg. The 
helpful staff allowed me to use one of the center's meeting rooms. Easily accessible, I found it an 
ideal space for one-to-one interviews. However, arranging a meeting during the CISR office hours 
was  not  always  possible;  two  of  the  interviews  were  conducted  in  cafés  at  the  interviewees'  
suggestion. Even though we managed to find tables away from other customers, loud music and 
people moving around us created disturbances hindering concentration,  which is  likely to  have 
affected the quality of the data. However, fieldwork without compromises is not always possible. 
One of the interviews was also conducted online through Skype, and one at the interviewee's home.
I did not enter the interview settings with a clear or fixed hypothesis; the purpose and focus was on 
exploring the topic (Kvale 1996: 127) of draft-avoidance in Russia. In feminist interviewing, one 
main  guiding  priciple  is  that  informants  should  participate  in  defining  and  ”deciding  what  is 
relevant knowledge about the research topic”107 (Oinas 2004: 214). With this in mind, I chose to 
employ semi-structured interview model; that is, in addition to the predetermined list of topics I 
brought  into  the  discussion,  I  encouraged  the  interviewees  to  introduce  issues  they considered 
relevant for the conversation (Bryman 2008: 438). As a consequence, each interview turned out 
unique. After every conversation, I checked the interview guide and modified, added and/or deleted 
106 http://www.cisr.ru/index.en.html
107 All quotations from Oinas (2004) are my translations.
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some questions, based on my evolving experience as interviewer.
In general, the informants showed keen interest in the topic, seemed motivated to participate in the 
project and volunteered information easily. In most of the interviews, the atmosphere was unhurried 
and relaxed. I was left with the impression that the interviewees felt that they had had the chance to 
express themselves openly and freely about the topics, which, after all, is one of the main aims of 
in-depth  interviewing.  Afterwards,  one  of  the  participants  mentioned  several  times  that  the 
interview had been a very positive experience, and if requested again in the future, he would be 
willing  to  participate  in  similar  research  projects108.  Misunderstandings  did  occur  during  the 
interviews,  but  they  were  quickly  resolved  through  further  explanations.  In  one  occasion,  an 
interviewee appeared uncomfortable about a question, and asked me to move on to the next one.
In addition, simply because I was constantly asked what had brought me to the city, I ended up 
discussing the topic of the study with nearly everyone I met during the time I spent in Russia. In 
general, people showed curious interest in the project and almost everyone had views and stories 
from their family to share. I was told time and again that I had chosen an extremely topical and 
important  theme to write  about.  Even though these random discussions do not form a body of 
primary data, systematically collected and analysed, I will occasionally draw upon and refer to them 
as well because they have helped to establish the context and widen my understanding about the 
topic.
3.5 Challenges and reflections
3.5.1 Language
Language  is  a  fundamental  tool  through which  qualitative  researchers  seek  to  understand  human behaviour, social  
processes and the cultural meanings that inscribe human behaviour. […] Failure to recognise and acknowledge the role 
of language and communication issues in cross-cultural research may impact on the rigour and reliability of the research 
(Hennink 2008: 21).
Language formed undoubtedly one of the main methodological challenges in the data collection. 
Having already spent an extended period of time in Russia as an exchange student, I was somewhat 
prepared for the challenge. I was confident that my language skills would be enough for conducting 
interviews in Russian. Nevertheless, not speaking perfect Russian, I was aware that I would not be 
108 See e.g. Kvale (1996: 116) about interview as a positive experience.
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able to catch all nuances and subtleties in native-speakers' speech, and, as an unfortunate result, 
some details would go unnoticed (see Pietilä 2010: 413). However, I did not consider using any 
other language than Russian in the interviews. Firstly, because I thought it would help minimize the 
discomfort  the  interviewees  might  feel  in  the  interview  situation.  Giving  the  interviewees  the 
opportunity to express themselves in their mother tongue, I hoped to get as rich data as possible. 
Secondly, I regarded the fact that I myself might not understand everything as the lesser of two 
evils: I would anyway be able to go through the interview recordings later, transcribe them and 
translate the parts that I had not fully understood, which would compensate my weaker position in 
terms of language.
Moreover, the language question is not only about whether someone 'gets the point' or not. Through 
language, both closeness and distance are created and managed; language builds connections and 
helps reach towards other people. Learning a foreign language can be a way to show profound 
interest  in  the  other  person's  world,  and  respect  to  their  culture.  Language  and  culture  are 
inseparable.  (Pietilä 2010).  In a couple of occassions, Russian friends of mine have told me that 
because I do not make the usual grammatical mistakes of foreigners, they sometimes actually forget 
that I am not Russian. Not claiming this was the case in the interviews, I still believe that speaking 
Russian smoothed the communication and helped in building rapport by making me less of a total 
stranger  and  cultural  outsider  to  the  interviewees.  Consequently,  sometimes  the  interviewees 
seemed to take it for granted that I knew certain things, for example, about local politics.
All  in  all,  there  is  no  doubt  that  my  still  limited  language  skills  made  me  less  ”attuned  and 
responsive” (Bryman 2008: 447) as an interviewer. Had the interviews been conducted in English, I 
would have been able to react faster and better, pose more follow-up questions, ask for clarifications 
and more detailed elaborations – things that I paid attention to and found missing afterwards while 
transcribing the interviews. Also, I noticed later that, being fully concentrated on what was being 
said,  I  had  hardly  paid  any  attention  to  observing  the  interviewees'  body  language.  The  tape 
recorder registers laughter and tones, but cannot help call back gestures and facial expressions.
What  is  more,  Russian  is  a  very rich  language  and  Russians  are  keen  on using  proverbs  and 
expressions loaded with symbolism. As a foreigner who has not grown up in the same cultural 
context,  understanding  all  the  explicit  and  implicit  meanings  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible. 
However, only a couple of the interviewees spoke English with an adequate level of confidence. 
Thus, in the interview process, language formed both a bridge and a gap: knowing Russian granted 
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me access, but a limited one, creating an interviewer position 'somewhere in-between'.
3.5.2 Being a Finn
[H]aving  insider  status  facilitates  rapport  and  trust-building  with  participants,  and  being  an  outsider  allows  the  
investigator to maintain a critical perspective (Sallee & Harris 2011: 427).
Rubin & Rubin (2005: 36) write: ”Because the interviewer contributes actively to the conversation, 
he or she must be aware of his or her own opinions, experiences, cultural definitions, and even 
prejudices.”  After  conducting  the  first  couple  of  interviews,  I  became  quickly  aware  of  my 
'Finnishness' – I started to notice how my own background had affected the presuppositions I held 
and the questions I was asking109. I have grown up in a country with universal male conscription 
where the majority of young men – around 80 per cent – serves in the armed forces (Kantola 2011: 
20). Since the institution touches every family, practically everyone in Finland has an opinion about 
conscription, including myself. Moreover, conscription is a theme that divides people; I remember 
especially well how discussions heated up in the last years of upper secondary school as the time 
came for boys to decide between the army and alternative service. Some even go to jail as a protest 
against conscription.
Societies with universal conscription have many things in common. As a Finn, I have – like Russian 
children – grown up surrounded by state-sponsored propaganda seeking to promote 'willingness to 
defend the fatherland'. When a Russian interviewee told me of having been afraid of his father's 
reaction and rejection when he decided he did not want to join the army, I remembered Finnish 
dads, ashamed of their sons who chose alternative service instead of military. Nevertheless, to avoid 
the draft in Russia is very different from avoiding the draft in Finland. In order to be able to start 
understanding the Russian situation, I realized I should drop the assumptions110 and opinions that 
made sense to me in the Finnish context.
Having become aware of my own departure point, situatedness and presuppositions, I tried to use 
them as basis for reflection: sometimes I briefly explained the Finnish conscription system to the 
interviewees,  which  often  led  to  fruitful  elaborations.  The  purpose  of  this  was  not  to  create 
comparison  between  the  two  countries  but  to  reflect  further  on  the  specificity  of  the  Russian 
109 ”In science, becoming aware of one's own views and presuppositions is not merely an epistemological or ethical question for the 
researcher but also a very concrete starting point that shapes the interview.”(Oinas 2004: 221, my translation).
110  In Finland, for example, not going to the army is usually considered a pacifist act.
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situation. According to Pietilä (2010: 415, 417), even comparison is not necessarily bad; the point is 
to make it visible. As Kvale (1996: 124) notes, ”[i]n the interview, knowledge is created inter the 
points of view of the interviewer and the interviewee”. Thus, there is no need to play down inter-
culturality or the fact that researcher and interviewee always represent two different perspectives. 
What is crucial is to become aware of the situation and its many consequences.
Further, listening intensively to and transcribing someone else's speech makes illogicalities that we 
all have in our thinking stand out much clearer than they would in a casual everyday conversation. 
Sometimes the interviewees simply seemed inconsistent in their views and contradicted themselves. 
However, Holliday (2002: 10) reminds: ”Researchers cannot put themselves above other people.” 
Even ambiguity in the interviewees' statements might merely reflect the existing ”contradictions in 
the  world  the  subject  lives  in”,  not  be  a  sign  of  a  person's  obscurity  (Kvale  1996:  31,  33). 
Maintaining a critical perspective as a researcher does not mean comparing, evaluating or judging 
the  interviewees'  stories.  On the  contrary,  good qualitative  research  becomes  impossible  if  the 
informant cannot ”trust  that the researcher will  handle her/his  story with respect” (Oinas 2004: 
224). I acknowledge that as a non-Russian, my understanding of the processes through which the 
informants' views and opinions have come into being is incomplete at its best. Neither do I know or 
understand everything that has affected their choices. Thus, my task as a researcher is to present and 
reflect upon – with respect and honesty – what the interviewees told me.
Moreover, my background is likely to have affected the way I was received by the interviewees. As 
mentioned earlier, the majority of foreigners visiting or living in St. Petersburg are Finns, and many 
of the city's residents travel regularly to Finland. Thus, peterburzhtsy have a perception, as well as a 
bunch of stereotypes, about their Western neighbours. Finnish journalist and writer Jussi Konttinen 
says  he  has  always  felt  welcome  in  Russia  and  calls  the  image  Russians  have  of  Finland 
unrealistically positive (Helsingin Sanomat, 19.02.2012). I share Konttinen's experience: travelling 
and living in the European part of Russia, I have been met with curiosity, warmth, and only good-
hearted joking about 'the Finnish slowness and quietness'. I have talked with Russians about painful 
topics like the World War II, about fathers and grandfathers who fought and died on the Karelian 
front111, but have never met bitterness nor prejudices towards me as a Finn. My experience is that I 
was well received also by the interviewees: they did not seem reserved nor doubtful of me or the 
purposes of the study. On the contrary, I was more often than not surprised of their openness and 
111  During the World War II, the Soviet Union and Finland were twice in war with each other: in 1939-1940 and 1941-1944. In 
Finland, the memory of the wars still provokes a lot of bitterness and even russophobia.
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how much more they actually told me than just answering the questions I posed.
According  to  Pietilä  (2010:  415-416),  in  a  cross-cultural  interview  setting  informants  might 
consciously or unconsciously take the role of a representative of their own country and culture. This 
can have various consequences. Firstly, many things may be clarified much more thoroughly to a 
foreigner than to a compatriot. At times I  too  was given detailed accounts on 'how things work 
around here' and many of the interviewees seemed to enjoy 'explaining things to a foreigner'. Being 
a cultural outsider can thus be an advantage for the interviewer: it might make the informants talk 
about and reflect on many taken-for-granted issues that would be otherwise ignored.
Moreover,  some  interviewees  can  take  a  defensive  position  and  try  to  avoid  talking  about 
unpleasent issues in order not to put their  country in a negative light.  Also the opposite might 
happen: participants can end up ”ventilating their thoughts” about life in their home country and be 
extremely critical  about  everything there.  (ibid.).  I  experienced both when interviewing for  the 
study; some informants tried to gloss over the problems in the military, while others had almost 
nothing positive to say about anything in Russia. Consequently, interpretation of the data will have 
to be a balancing act between the two extremes.
3.5.3 Cross-gender interviewing
Positioning is, therefore, the key practice in grounding knowledge (Haraway 1988: 587).
One of the starting points and assumptions of this study has been that conscription and its avoidance 
are gendered phenomena. However, gender should not be thought of merely as an object of study or 
a variable in analysis; it is also part of the research process itself, and a very significant factor that 
shapes the interview situation. As Edwards (1990: 482) reminds us, ”[c]haracteristics such as class, 
sex, and race belong not just to the people who we conduct our research on or about, but are also 
characteristics of the researcher”. Hence, I recognize that not only the cross-cultural but also cross-
gender nature of interviewing in this study, that is,  young Russian men being interviewed by a 
young foreign female, is likely to have affected the data collection process and its outcomes112.
112 I share Hearn & Kimmel's view that, unlike some have claimed, men do not have a privilege to study other men. Neither does 
being a man make one automatically more suitable to conduct research on masculinities: ”Studying men cannot be left only to  
men. Men’s knowledge of themselves is at best limited and partial, at worst violently patriarchal.” (Hearn & Kimmel 2006: 61).  
However, it is nevertheless important to pay attention to and reflect upon the possible effects that the researcher's gender has.
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Oinas notes (2004: 220) that the researcher should not fall into speculating or trying to guess ”what  
the interviewee thought, felt or experienced”. I cannot say if being interviewed by myself was more 
or less pleasant for the informants than talking to someone else – for example a man, someone older 
or younger, someone who had been to the military, or Russian – would have been. Nevertheless, 
some  facts  allow  me  to  suppose  that,  from my  own  perspective,  being  a  female  interviewer 
probably had some advantages. Firstly, I experienced that it was relatively easy for me to take and 
maintain a neutral position to the research topic because the question whether I myself had been to 
the military was not relevant. Thus, the fact that the military is considered a male realm possibly 
worked to my advantage; at least to a certain extent, I could position myself outside the whole 
institution of conscription and the debate around it, since I was not compelled to take a stand in the  
same way as, for example, a young (Finnish) man would have to.
Secondly, in Russia, it is typically women who defend their sons, grandsons, brothers, boyfriends 
and husbands against the abuses of the military and help them to avoid the draft, while male family 
members tend to remain passive or even show disapproval. In other words, I represented the gender 
that is, in general, considered to be understanding and supportive of young men's choice not to go to 
the army. It is, therefore, possible that cross-gender interviewing diminished ”the need to live up to 
[traditional]  masculine  expectations”  (Sallee  &  Harris  2011:  426)  among  the  interviewees113. 
However, it should be noted that it is not only other men who question and threaten the masculine 
identity of young Russian army-avoiders. One of the interviewees told me that it was, in fact, girls, 
mostly ”less educated and from the villages”, who had criticized him for not having been to the 
military.
The  fact  that  my  gender,  among  many  other  factors,  is  likely  to  have  affected  the  way  the 
informants expressed themselves can lead one to doubt if another researcher would have managed 
to obtain more 'authentic', 'pure' or 'truthful' data. What studies like Sallee and Harris' (2011) show 
is  that  qualitative  interviewing  should  not  be  romanticized  as  an  ideal  or  unproblemtatic  data 
collection  method.  Qualitative  research  interview  is  not  merely  an  instrument  of  knowledge 
acquisition but also ”a construction site of knowledge” (Kvale 1996: 2, 42). It is a two-directional, 
interactive process (Babbie 2010: 318, 320; Bryman 2008: 436, 438; David & Sutton 2004: 87; 
Oinas 2006: 220) where the interviewer's personal qualities as well as the interviewee's conscious 
113 Sallee and Harris (2011) have studied how researcher's gender may influence ”data collection and rapport building with male  
participants” in masculinity studies. According to their findings, those who were interviewed by the male researcher were ”more  
open” but also at the same time more ”conscious about fulfilling expectations of traditional masculinities”, while ”[s]peaking  
with a woman allowed some of the participants to engage in thoughtful reflection about masculinities” (Sallee & Harris 2011: 
416, 425-426).
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and unconscious expectations of what the researcher wants to hear play a role (Aitamurto, Jäppinen 
& Kulmala 2010: 41; Sallee & Harris 2011: 410). In fact, our behaviour is always context-bound 
(Cornwall 2009: 10). Since our identities ”as women or men are not fixed or absolute, but multiple 
and shifting” (Cornwall & Lindisfarne 1994, quoted in Cornwall 2009: 10), we constantly shift our 
subject-positions according to the situation we are in (Hollway 1984, quoted in Cornwall 2009: 10).
In interview, only one out of an endless number of potential stories is told (Oinas 2004: 220), and 
the choice of the story depends on how the informant experiences the interview situation and the 
interviewer. According to Oinas (2004: 220-221), ”all narratives are momentary, situated and aimed 
at a particular audience”. Thus, there is no 'authentic', 'pure' or 'truthful' data. In Haywood & Mac an 
Ghail's (2003: 17) words, ”the micropolitics of the interview do  not distort the collection of real 
facts  as  there  are  no  existentially  real  objects”114.  No  interview  material  is  an  unmediated 
representation of social reality and the interviewee's experience but a product of interaction between 
two embodied social beings in a particular space and time. What remains for the researcher to do is 
the task of grounding the study or being aware of and reflecting upon the factors that influence the 
data collection process. I acknowledge that, like any other perspective, my study is a partial, limited 
and situated (see Haraway 1988).
3.6 Summary
This chapter has focused on the methodological issues of the study. Data collection was carried out 
in St. Petersburg, a city where most young men never enter military service. In order to highlight 
the  micro  perspective  of  draft-avoidance  and  emphasize  the  views  of  ordinary  young  men 
themselves,  I  chose  to  deploy  qualitative  in-depth  interviewing  as  the  primary  data  collection 
method.  Altogether, eight semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in St. Petersburg in 
August and September  2011, and one in Tromsø in 2012.  The informants were recruited through 
social networks, which had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, having the initial 
contact facilitated by a trustworthy third party that both the interviewee and I knew from before is 
likely to have made building rapport and trust easier. On the other hand, there is little variation what 
comes to, for instance, the  research  participants' backgrounds.  Since qualitative interviewing is a 
two-way process, had I, the interviewer, been someone else, the  informants would probably have 
chosen a  different  way to talk about  themselves,  their  lives  and their  views.  Nevertheless,  my 
114 Epistemologically, this study positions itself in the tradition of social constructivism (e.g. Burr 1995). According to Alasuutari 
(2001: 114-115), talking about 'truthfulness' is irrelevant, because cultural and social studies are not about researching and 
establishing 'facts'; the purpose is to explore and understand socially constructed meanings.
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impression was that being a foreigner and woman who new Russian was rather advantageous than 
disadvantageous.
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Chapter 4. Conceptual framework
This  chapter attempts a conceptual framework to the study of draft-avoidance in contemporary 
Russia. Firstly, it discusses the concept of gender as a social construction of masculinity. Notions 
about masculinity are central in shaping men's identities and are manifested in how men behave, 
make choices and exercise agency. Moreover, masculine identity can prove to be disempowering or 
empowering; that is, transformative. Thus, in order to highlight the informants' views and explain 
draft-avoidance  in  today's  Russia,  this  study draws  further  on  the  concept  of  empowerment.  I 
approach empowerment through three interrelated dimensions: agency, critical consciousness and 
identity.  With  the  choice  of  concepts  I  seek  to  suggest  that  gender  identity  has  transforming 
potential at the individual and social level.
From the beginning of this project, it  has been clear to me that the analysis of military service 
avoidance should include a gender perspective. The reason is simple: the conscription system does 
not just  touch Russians in general,  but young Russian men in particular.  This thus makes both 
conscription  and  its  avoidance  gendered  phenomena.  The  further  choice  of  the  concepts  of 
empowerment, including its three dimensions, is based on findings from the fieldwork. In other 
words, instead of taking one strict conceptual framework as its starting point, the study has rather 
allowed the empirical data to guide the selection of additional related concepts. In this way, I hope 
to best conceptualize the perspectives of the interviewed Russian draft-avoiders and, eventually, 
highlight the research questions. As Rubin & Rubin (2005: 210) point out, ”[m]ore important than 
borrowing  concepts  and  themes  from  the  literature  is  finding  those  that  emerge  from  the 
interviews”.
The  concepts  of  masculinity  and  empowerment  both  speak  to  issues  related  to  social  change. 
Empowerment  entails  change  by  definition;  it  refers  to  liberation  from  the  condition  of 
disempowerment.  In  the  Russian  context,  on  the  other  hand,  masculinity  notions  have  been 
intertwined  with,  if  not  inseparable  from,  wider  transformation  processes  in  the  society.  As 
Clements (2002: 12) explains:
What  is  certain  [...]  is  the  centrality  of  conceptions  of  the  masculine  in  Russia's  past.  Tsarist  bureaucrats,  
Stalinist  economic  planners,  intellectuals  and  social  reformers  from  the  eighteenth  to  the  twentieth  century  
understood that they could not change Russia unless and until they changed Russian men. Fundamental to this task 
was defining what Russian men were and what they should become.
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4.1 Gender and Masculinity
The term gender refers to ”the social and cultural construction of 'biological' sexes”; that is, how 
culturally produced meanings are attached to human bodies (Järviluoma, Moisala & Vilkko 2003: 1; 
Connell 2002: 10). Defined as above, gender might seem to be a limited perspective for a study that 
seeks to highlight and understand a phenomenon that affects not only individuals but the Russian 
society  as  a  whole,  which  is  undergoing  complex  post-Soviet  transformations.  However,  the 
concept of gender is not an isolated object or limited to human bodies. On the contrary, it reaches  
beyond them; gender is ”an aspect of a larger structure”, which has explanatory power and offers a 
useful  platform and focus from where to  analyse changing social  processes (Goddard 2000:  3; 
Connell 2001: 30).
Further,  this  thesis  concerns  itself  more  precisely  with  gender  as  a  cultural  construction  of 
masculinity. Whitehead & Barrett (2001: 15-16) define masculinity as ”those behaviours, languages 
and  practices,  existing  in  specific  cultural  and  organizational  locations,  which  are  commonly 
associated with males and thus culturally defined as not feminine”. In other words, masculinity 
refers to what it means to be a man or what are appropriate male ways of life in a certain context  
(Buchbinder 1994; Haywood & Mac an Ghail 2003: 154).115
Masculinity as an element of gender also provides a useful analytic tool for understanding social 
phenomena and change (Connell 2000: xix). This is because it helps to explain why men act the 
way they do.  Thus,  masculinity  is  not  only about  abstract  meanings  and socio-cultural  gender 
constructions, but it is also manifested in the very concrete ways of ”talking and acting as males” 
(Whitehead & Barrett 2001: 21). As Whitehead (2002: 43) puts it: ”[W]hile masculinities may be 
illusory, the material consequences of many men's practices are quite real enough” in everyday life.
To  examine  masculinities,  as  socio-cultural  constructions  that  arise  from  particular  historical 
circumstances, means taking into consideration that they are not fixed but constantly in the making, 
and that the understandings of masculinity are informed by contextual everyday practices and vice 
versa (Connell 2000: 13-14; Whitehead & Barrett 2001: 8). In other words, if the social context 
changes, it will also affect masculinity ideas and practices  (Whitehead & Barrett 2001: 8). New 
conditions produce new ways of managing the everyday life, which is reflected in notions about 
115 It should be noted that applying the concept of masculinity is not about describing and dividing men into groups according to  
some certain masculinity model they appear to represent. That would easily lead to  categorizing and labeling people, and eventually  
only creating or reinforcing stereotypes, which is in stark contradiction with the original priciples and purpose of Gender Studies and 
Critical Men's and Masculinity Studies (e.g. critical deconstruction).
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how to be and act as a man in that context. This means that social, political and economic changes 
can  lead  to  a  situation  where  old  notions  about  gender  can  be  questioned,  renegotiated,  and 
reconstructed (Connell 2000: 13-14).
Gender, masculinity and identity
The concepts of gender and masculinity are closely interlinked with that of identity. Identity refers 
to ”that which gives us a sense of self, which tells us who we are and what we do” (O'Hagan 2009:  
28).  In other  words,  our  self-expression and actions  are  informed by our identity116.  Moreover, 
gender is one of the main factors that shape and organize our identities: our sense of self is to a 
considerable degree based on our interpretations of what it is to be a woman or man in that specific 
social context where we find ourselves (Goddard: 2002: 4; Woodward 2003: 43; Guttermann 2001: 
61).
Further,  masculinities as socially accepted ways of being male are crucial to male identity work 
because they can help men to consolidate and validate the otherwise shaky, unsteady and ”fluid” 
sense of  self  (Whitehead and Barrett  2001:  20).  Thus,  masculinities provide men something to 
anchor their identities on and relate role expectations to, tangible enough perceptions of who I am 
and how I am supposed to lead my life in this particular time and place as a man.
Identity  is  a  relational  construction.  It  means  that  in  mirroring  oneself  against  'the  Other'  and 
”recognizing that which is different, the self begins to define itself” (O'Hagan 2009: 28; Goff & 
Dunn 2009a:  2).  Gaining a  masculine  sense of  self  is  often  about  distinguishing oneself  from 
women and that which is culturally defined as feminine; to be masculine is to be not-feminine. 
However,  equally  important  for  male  identity  work  is  how  men  through  association  and 
differentiation relate to other men (Whitehead and Barrett 2001: 20). It is with other males that men 
compare themselves; men admire and identify with some men while rejecting others as anti-heroes, 
and  simultaneously  coming  to  terms  with  who  they  themselves  are.  Hence,  masculinity  and 
masculine identity are relational constructions that emerge from association of difference (Barrett 
2001: 78).
Moreover, it is especially in different mileposts in the individual's life that our personal identities 
are formed and reformed, negotiated and renegotiated. For young men, taking a stand on military 
116 Hence, the concept of identity encourages the consideration of agency. The concept of agency will be discussed later in this 
chapter.
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service can be a significant moment for personal identity work because at the same time it is about – 
consciously or unconsciously – taking a stand in relation to multiple and competing masculinity 
ideals and pratices. (Pilkington 1996: 1-2).
Masculinity and the Russian context
Taking into account the particularity of the socio-cultural context, especially the influence of the 
Soviet legacy is important when examining masculinity in today's Russia. Precisely, because the 
State is often involved in the construction of gender roles and ideals (Connell 2000: 30). In Russia, 
for example, it has been notably active and authoritarian when trying to shape men and notions 
about  proper  masculinity – with the purpose of  creating ”loyal  obedient,  cooperative  subjects” 
(Clements 2002: 11-12; Friedman & Healey 2002: 224; Kay 2006; Tartakovskaya 2005)117. In the 
strictly hierarchical Soviet society, the position a man held in relation to the State defined his social 
standing and life perspectives (Meshcherkina 2000: 105-106). In order to be acknowledged as a 
man, one had to serve the State (Ashwin 2000: 1; Tartakovskaya 2005: 128; Koukarenko 2007) and 
in this system being a worker and a soldier formed the core of officially recognized proper manhood 
(Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2002). Failure to fulfill these roles which the State assigned to Soviet 
men, meant risking social ostracism and one's manhood stripped away sociologically.
A gender  identity  can  be  empowering  or  disempowering  for  individuals.  The  identity  that  the 
ordinary Soviet men were encouraged to embrace and express as servers of the State and defenders 
of the Fatherland, was the identity of a kind of oppressed heroes who were expected to set the needs 
of  the  society  above  their  own  interests.  This  subordination  to  the  system that  did  not  allow 
independence, self-sufficiency or individual autonomy, provoked a ”feeling of frustration among 
men  concerning  their  gender  identity”.  (Koukarenko  2007:  99-101).  Hence,  the  Soviet  period 
produced a male identity that lacked a sense of fulfilment, a masculine self-expression that was 
disempowering.
However,  the  developments  of  the  late  1980s118 and  finally  the  break-up  of  the  Soviet  Union 
weakened the State to the extent that it lost the controlling role it had had in the construction of 
gender  roles  and  identities  (Zdravomyslova  &  Temkina  2002;  ibid.  2003b:  56;  see  also 
Tartakovskaya  2000:  135).  The  socio-political  and  economic  transformations  created  space  to 
117 In chapter 2, a somewhat detailed account was given of how soldiering was connected to the idea of manliness in the Soviet  
period.
118  In the second half of the 1980s, Perestroika, the reform of the economic and social system initiated by the last leader of the 
USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, together with the Glasnost policy that was to make the Soviet government more open and democratic 
started transforming the socio-political environment.
41
renegotiate social practices, including gender roles and ideals.  As a counterreaction to the state-
propagated image of  an ideal  Soviet  man,  a  new masculinity model  emerged.  It  drew on ”the 
normative models of a 'real man' that were unattainable during the Soviet period” and emphasized 
independence,  liberalism,  autonomy,  professionalism,  civil  rights  and  democratic  freedoms. 
(Koukarenko 2007: 105). According to Connell (2000: 12), ”[m]asculinities are often in tension, 
within and without. It seems likely that such tensions are important sources of change.” Similarly,  
the  inner  tensions  and  frustration  the  official  Soviet  masculinity  and  masculine  identity  had 
produced led to change and the creation of new notions of what it means to be a man.119
Today Russia is characterized by a competition between old and new ideas about gender, femininity 
and masculinity (Zdravomyslova and Temkina 2003a: 19-20). On the one hand, the notions about 
masculinity  that  were  created  and  continuously  reinforced  during  the  Soviet  period  have  not 
disappeared (Kon 2002: 234). Soldiering particularly is still widely considered to be the basic civic 
duty of all men (Caiazza 2002: 5), and the idea is kept alive by the ones in power 120. Those who 
question or criticize the conscription institution are met with speculations about their  manliness 
(Shaburova 2005: 94).
On the other hand, however, the Russian society has in many ways changed profoundly since the 
late 1980s and such values of market capitalism as individualism and independence continue to 
strengthen  especially  among  the  youth  (Petrov  2008;  Skutneva  2003;  Ashwin  2000:  18; 
Meshcherkina 2000: 109; Ruchkin 1998). Now, many young men see career success as the marker 
and expression of manliness (Semenova & Utkina 2004: 130). For them, coping socio-economically 
on one's own without relying on help or recognition from the state is natural.
Large-scale draft-avoidance is a good example of how the post-Soviet changes have paved the way 
for traditional masculinity ideals and practices to be questioned and restructured.  If  joining the 
military and becoming a soldier was a gender practice, which was taken for granted in the Soviet 
times, it is now repeatedly contested and negotiated in the new Russia. The consequence being that 
draft-avoidance has become so commonplace.
119 There were, of course, not only one but a plurality of Russian Soviet masculinities. The focus here is on the normative models 
that were propagated by the state. (see Koukarenko 2007: 97).
120 For example through the Patriotic Education Programs
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4.2 Empowerment
Another  theoretical  concept  that  this  thesis  draws  on  is  empowerment.  In  recent  years 
empowerment has become a popular term in development policy discourse, and it has been applied 
especially  in  studies  about  women  and  other  socially  disadvantaged  social  groups  like  poor 
people121.
This study, however, is not a study about empowerment in development context. It only takes as its  
starting point the consideration that ”men can also feel powerless”. Thus, there is no reason why the 
concept of empowerment could not be applied in studies on and about them, too. (Cornwall 2009: 
12). Further, this study does not focus on a socio-economically disadvantaged group of young men. 
In fact, the young men that were interviewed for the study are generally economically better-off 
than the majority of those who join the army122.  Nevertheless,  the concept  of empowerment  is 
relevant  in  highlighting  the  interviewees'  gendered  experiences  in  the  context  of  change  and 
continuity.
In order to avoid an overtly development-oriented perspective and to ”envision a more nuanced 
model of empowerment”, Carr (2003: 12-13) suggests the consideration of critical consciousness, 
identity,  and  agency.  In  this  thesis,  I  thus  define  empowerment  through  these  three,  closely 
interrelated  dimensions.  The  processes  of  empowerment  can  occur  through  many  different 
pathways, and this approach that focuses on consciousness, identity and agency, represents one of 
them.
The term empowerment has multiple meanings:
[S]elf-strength, control, self-power, self-reliance, own choice, life of dignity in accordance with one’s values, capable 
of fighting for one’s rights, independence, own decision making, being free, awakening, and capability (World Bank 
2002: 10).
Many scholars connect empowerment first and foremost to the ability of individuals or groups to 
exercise choice in a meaningful and purposeful manner. For instance, Kabeer (2001: 19; 1999: 435) 
defines the term as ”the expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context 
where this ability was previously denied to them”. Strategic choices are those ”life choices which 
121 See e.g. Cornwall's (2009) critique of disregarding ”the 'other' gender”, that is, men's experiences and  problems in the Gender 
and Development discourse.
122 As for example Lokshin & Yemtsov's (2005) study shows, it is the poor families and young men who carry ”the burden of 
conscription” in today's Russia. 
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are critical for people to live the lives they want”. This means, for example, making decisions about 
profession, marriage, and family (Kabeer 1999: 437).
Furthermore, I find it useful to examine the processes of empowerment through disempowerment 
because the two are ”inescapably bound up with” each other (Kabeer 2001: 18-19). In other words, 
empowerment implies managing and overcoming the condition of disempowerment (Kabeer 2005: 
13-14). It can hence mean, for example, resisting power relations, pursuing one's goals despite of 
opposition from others, challenging old notions and customs, taken-for-granted truths and practices 
that did not seem negotiable before (Parpart,  Rai & Staudt 2002a: 6; NORAD 1999: 4; Kabeer 
2001: 21). 
Empowerment can be both individual and/or collective (World Bank 2002: 10). Draft-avoidance is 
clearly a phenomenon and, thus, has a collective dimension. In this discussion, however, the focus 
is  on  the  individual  and  personal  rather  than  on  collective  empowerment;  as  this  study  is 
specifically about individual choices in today's Russia and not, for example, about an organized 
movement.  Studying empowerment at the individual level directs attention to features like self-
reliance and internal strength (Moser 1993: 74-75), as well as the sense of or ability to exercise 
autonomy (Parpart, Rai & Staudt 2002b: 240; Malhotra & Schuler 2006: 78; Narayan 2006: 3).
4.2.1 Agency
Agency is often defined as one of the key components of empowerment (e.g. Kabeer 1999: 435; 
Malhotra & Schuler 2006). It refers to ”the ability to define one's goals and act upon them” (Kabeer  
2001: 21). This involves making choices and being able  ”to transform these choices into desired 
actions”  (Petesch,  Smilovitz  &  Walton  2006:  40).  Hence,  agency  points  to  the  core  idea  of 
empowerment – expanding the ability to make choices means expanding the ability to act as an 
agent who strives towards the realization of self-defined goals and thereby actively directs her/his 
own life.
Further,  social  agents  do  not  operate  in  a  vacuum  but  in  a  constant  negotiation  with  their 
surrounding  environment  or  social  structures  (e.g.  laws,  rules,  norms  and  values).  To exercise 
agency, to work towards the realization of certain self-defined goals entails overcoming structural 
impediments.  The  constraining  aspects  of  social  structure  can  be  ”experienced  as  sanctions of 
various kinds, ranging from the direct application of violence, or the threat of such application, to  
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the mild expression of disapproval”. For example, in the Soviet period, army-avoidance was met 
with harsh sanctions; a man who did not complete military service was condemned to life on the 
outskirts of the society, without access to education or hope of a decent job. However, structures as 
”systems of generative rules and resources” do not only constrain; they also cultivate, trigger and 
enable agency. Moreover, through their excersice of agency, individuals can contribute either to the 
reproduction or transformation of their surroundings. (Giddens 1984: 25, 171, 175; Giddens 1976: 
127 quoted in Loyal 2003: 74).
Choices that merely reflect others' expectations do not increase the individual's ability to shape and 
control her/his own life and are thus not empowering (Freire 1974: 7; Narayan 2006: 4; World Bank 
2002:  10).  Exercising  agency  implies  that  choices  made  are  truly  the  individual's  own,  not 
prescribed from the outside (Freire 1974: 4). This, on the other hand, is possible only if  ”the actor  
is  able to envision alternative paths  of action” (Petesch,  Smilovitz and Walton 2006: 42),  gaze 
beyond those paths that are taken for granted and offered to her/him by others. In other words, it 
means  being  capable  of  taking  a  critical  stand  to  the  prevailing  social  order  and  imagining 
alternatives to it. This brings us to the concept of critical consciousness.
4.2.2 Critical consciousness
The term critical consciousness refers to what the World Bank (2002: 10) defined as 'awakening'. 
Many scholars see the emergence of critical  consciousness as central  to becoming empowered. 
Kabeer  (2001:  25)  defines  it  as  ”the  process  by  which  people  move  from  a  position  of 
unquestioning acceptance of the social order to a critical perspective on it”. Even though Paulo 
Freire did not use the term empowerment when writing about critical pedagogy for liberation from 
oppression,  many empowerment scholars ”have built  on Freire’s (1970) foundational claim that 
intensive reflection of oneself in relation to society, that is conscientization, is a necessary precursor 
to engaging in social change” (Carr 2003: 8-9).
According to Freire, developing a critical consciousness means to take an active role in relation to 
the world – instead of being a passive receiver, one becomes a reflective participant, who is aware 
of her/his own temporality and context. Instead of being an object, a person becomes a subject, an 
agent who is capable of adapting to the reality but in a reflexive way, with ”the critical capacity to 
make choices and transform that reality”. (Freire 1974: 3-4).
45
In  Freire's  (1974:  15-16)  view,  critical  consciousness  is  especially  needed  in  periods  of  social 
change and transition, as it helps people to relate to what is happening around and to them and act  
as agents despite the instability and unpredictability of the times.  Kabeer (2001: 25), on the other 
hand, sees change as something that enables the emergence of critical consciousness:
[A] more critical consciousness, only becomes possible when competing ways of 'being and doing' become available 
as material and cultural possibilities, so that 'common sense' propositions of culture begin to lose their 'naturalised' 
character, revealing the underlying arbitrariness of the given social order.
In the Russian context, it can be said that the late- and post-Soviet transformations opened both 
materially,  socially  as  well  as  culturally  new  ways  of  doing  and  being  a  Russian  man,  new 
masculinities. The old social order no longer appeared to be the only possible reality because it 
simply stopped functioning: a man could no more depend upon the State socio-economically, but 
had to get by on his own. Yet the old has not disappear completely. However, the fact that it has  
now 'lost its naturalised character' has enabled the development of critical consciousness as what 
was previously taken for granted can now be questioned, and what had to be obeyed, can be flauted.
4.2.3 Identity
Identity is the last of the three dimensions through which empowerment is approached in this paper. 
According to Kabeer (2005: 15),  ”[e]mpowerment is rooted in how people see themselves – their 
sense of self-worth”. Identity is at the core of empowerment (Staples 1990: 38, quoted in Carr 2003: 
17)  firstly because  it  is  the  foundation  of  agency.  Making strategic  and conscious  life  choices 
implies  that  you  know  who  you  are  and  what  you  want.  Secondly,  the  processes  of  identity 
construction are closely connected with the emergence of critical consciousness. Developing critical 
consciousness does not only allow people to see the world around them differently but also to 
explore new ways of defining who they themselves are and what is their position in the society 
(Carr 2003: 15). Hence, identity construction and developing both critical consciousness and ability 
to exercise agency are mutually constituting processes.
Further,  gender  identity  is  closely  linked  to  both  empowerment  and  disempowerment.  Kabeer 
(2005: 14) writes that ”[g]ender often operates through the unquestioned acceptance of power”. 
This means that by internalizing ideas about masculinity and feminity, people do not only construct 
a gendered identity but also come to accept their own position, even inequality and subordination 
(ibid.). In this way, gender identity can be either empowering or disempowering – depending on 
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whether it encourages or discourages independent choices and an autonomous life.
As discussed earlier, the dominant Soviet masculinity ideals tried to consolidate a submissive male 
identity in order to secure that men became and remained loyal servers of the State.  According to 
Kabeer  (2005:  14),  people ”are  likely to  accept,  and even collude with,  their  lot  in  society,  if 
challenging this either does not appear possible or carries heavy personal and social costs”. This 
happened to a large extent also in the Soviet society – until the reforms of  1980s opened for the 
questioning of male roles and practices assigned by the State and as also army-avoidance was no 
longer met with such harsh sanctions as before.
4.3 Summary
This  chapter  has  sought  to  outline  the  conceptual  framework of  the  thesis.  Firstly,  in  order  to 
understand and explain why young Russian men seek to avoid compulsory military service, I have 
introduced the concept of masculinity. Masculinity refers to socially constructed notions of how to 
be and what it means to be a man in a specific cultural context. This thesis concerns itself with 
masculinity  because  it  is  a  central  component  in  male  identity  building  processes  and  further, 
masculine identity guides men's self-expression and actions, the choices they make in a changing 
social system. 
Further, I have also chosen to use the term empowerment as an analytical lens to illuminate the 
Russian draft-avoiders' perspectives. Empowerment is here understood as the expansion of people's 
ability to exercise choice, which means being able to direct and control one's own life. I approach 
empowerment through three interrelated dimensions: agency, critical consciousness and identity.
The three dimensions of empowerment are mutually constituting. Firstly, agency is a manifestation 
of  self-definition  or  identity,  which again is  gendered.  Secondly,  agency is  founded on critical 
consciousness, the ability to critically consider the prevailing social order. Critical consciousness 
again effects  individual's  identity work because it  enables her/him to question the condition of 
disempowerment  and,  consquently,  imagine  and  take  new  subject  positions.  Further,  both  the 
concepts of critical consciousness and agency place an acting and reflecting individual at the heart 
of processes of empowerment.
Taken together, empowerment, agency and critical consciousness speak to the challenging of power 
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relations and the issues of change and social transformation (Kabeer 2005: 14). In the Soviet period, 
values and beliefs about masculinity were used to legitimize the subordination of men to the needs 
of  the  State.  Through  the  case  of  draft-avoidance,  this  thesis  seeks  to  direct  attention  to  how 
masculinity can take transformative forms, that is, enable men to analyse, question and act on the 
structures that constrain them (see Kabeer 2005: 15). This question will be further examined in the 
next chapter, as I move on to the dialogue between the theory and the empirical material in data 
presentation and analysis.
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Chapter 5. Data presentation and analysis
This  chapter  presents  and  discusses  the  field  data.  It  begins  with  focusing  on  the  informants' 
background information, as such issues as education, occupation and where people live and have 
lived are likely to affect opinion and attitude formation and maintenance. It also looks at social 
networks  vis-a-vis  military  service,  because  people's  immediate  social  surroundings  can  be 
expected to have an impact on their life choices and aspirations, as well as identities. Further, the 
chapter attempts to tap into the interviewees' individual reflections on why they had wished to avoid 
military service.  Hence, in this section,  by looking at  the interviewees'  narratives123 through the 
theoretical concepts laid out in the previous section, the study seeks to explain draft-avoidance.
5.1 Informant presentation
5.1.1 A note on informant protection and anonymity
We are products of the life lived: everything we have done and experienced influences our thinking 
and  actions  today.  This  is  why scientific  efforts  to  understand  and explain  human  experiences 
usually begin with the informants' background information in time and place. At the same time, 
however, the informants' privacy and security have to be taken into serious consideration, despite 
the need for detailed background and contextualization of information.
Military service avoidance is a potentially sensitive topic (Eichler 2012), and for an individual man, 
noncompliance with the draft regulations can have grave legal consequences. Even though I did not 
ask the interviewees if they had circumvented or broken the law, the security aspect of the research 
topic should not be disregarded. The present interviewees have, in one way or another, engaged in 
struggle with the conscription system. Participation in this study should not put anyone in any kind 
of danger nor in an uncomfortable situation. Hence, the interviewees were assured confidentiality 
and anonymity, and I have sought to keep the promise to the best of my abilities. Firstly, in order to  
guarantee anonymity, fictive names have been provided. Secondly, I have chosen not to attach all 
personal details to each interviewee. In other words, some background information is given without 
reference to individual informants. I am aware that the effort to keep the interviewees' identities 
covered  reduces  the  possibility  to  contextualise  their  narratives.  However,  every  study  has  to 
determine its presentational approach (Silverman 2005). The one that I have chosen for this study is 
123 The interview extracts are my translations and virtually verbatim. Only some minor editing has been done for better 
understandability and coherence. 
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a compromise, a balancing act between my aspiration to do good research, on the one hand, and the  
effort to protect my informants, on the other.
5.1.2 Background of informants
Education and occupation
For the study, a total of nine men were interviewed. Table 1 presents all the interviewees with their 
educational  and  occupational  backgrounds. Seven interviewees  had  or  were  enrolled  in higher 
(university)  education  and  represented  the  following  fields:  information  technology,  financing, 
programming, economics, administration, social pedagogy and psychology, and music. One of the 
interviewees had secondary vocational education as a cook, and one was in the process of applying 
for higher education.  Seven of the informants were working; two of them had jobs that did not 
correspond to the education they had. One was still a student.
Age, civil status and living arrangements
The  interviewees  were  aged between  18 and 31124.  One of  the  interviewees  was  married  with 
children, while the others were either single or seeing someone. Two of the informants lived alone; 
one was living together with his girlfriend, and others lived at home with parents and siblings or 
shared a rented flat with friends.
Seven interviewees out of nine were currently living in St. Petersburg. Five were originally from St. 
Petersburg, and two from a minor provincial capital, Pskov, situated about 20 kilometres from the 
border to Estonia and 290 km from St. Petersburg. One interviewee was from and currently living in 
Samara, the sixth largest city in Russia, situated in the South East. One was from Murmansk, a city 
located in the northwest of Russia, on the Kola Peninsula,  close to Russia's borders with Finland 
and Norway, with a population of about 300,000.
One interviewee was currently living in Tromsø, Norway. Also three other interviewees had lived 
abroad  due  to  studies  and/or  work  during  their  adult  life,  including  the  following  countries: 
Germany, the UK, Spain, and the USA (see table 1). Living in another country is an experience that 
can  be  expected  to  affect  individual  perceptions  and attitudes  in  a  profound way.  Exposure to 
another  culture,  lifestyle,  values  and  social  system  is  not  only  likely  to  shape  young  men's 
consiousness, but also to lead to comparisons, and, consequently, viewing one's home country from 
124 Some of the interviewees had been in draft age before 2008, when the conscription law was changed and the lenght of obligatory 
service was reduced to one year. Hence, some of the interviewees talk about two years instead of one when refering to service.
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a different perspective (e.g. Byram & Feing 2006; Dolby 2004). As Dima indicated: ”I have lived  
long and many times outside Russia. That's why I know what to compare with.” Two informants had 
lived in other parts of the former USSR when they were young.
The background issues are  captured in the table  below. Summing up, the present  interviewees' 
educational  and  occupational  choices  suggest  that  the  young  men  are  well  integrated  into  the 
modern market system. Further, it can be said that almost half of the informants have embraced an 
international and mobile lifestyle.
Table 1. Interviewees' educational and occupational backgrounds, and experience from living 
abroad
Pseudonym Education Specialism / field of occupation Had lived or was 
living abroad
Anton Higher Programming
Dima Higher Commerce, information technology x
Ilya Higher Financing x
Maksim Higher Social pedagogy, psychology / student
Misha Higher Music x




Viktor Secondary Applying for higher education
Yurii Higher Economics, administration
Source: Fieldwork 2011, 2012.
5.1.3 Influence of social networks
As Meshcherkina (2000: 105) writes: ”[N]o individual can be seen as atomised – every situation in 
which s/he finds her/himself has been partially created by wider social factors”.  In other words, 
people's choices are to a considerable degree influenced by their social environment. In the case of 
draft-avoidance, too, the young men's decisions have been affected by the expectations of their 
families, friends and immediate social environment.
Despite the massive reductions that the armed forces have been through since the break-up of the 
USSR, the military remains a major employer with a personnel of about 1 million people to date 125. 
125 http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20091204/157098191.html
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Hence,  a  great  many Russian  families  have  some kind of  a  connection  to  it,  with the  present 
interviewees  being  no  exception.  Several  interviewees  had  older  brothers  who  had  served. In 
addition,  Anton's  father  was  a  reserve  officer  and  Ilya's  a  professional  soldier.  Almost  all  the 
interviewees indicated that their fathers expected them to serve. These family expectations were 
exemplified by Yurii as such: ”Because like everybody says, it's the second school where they make  
youngsters men. […] I had a feeling that father would have liked it”. Further, Ilya had been anxious 
of  his  father's  reaction and tried to  avoid discussing  the  topic with him.  However,  the  service 
question was not eventually so important that it would have turned into a conflict and damaged the 
relationship between the two:
My dad's a professional soldier, and from his side there was a problem. He.. we did not tell him openly that with mom we.. 
work against voenkomat. But he guessed. I was of course afraid that it will ruin my relationship to him because he even 
suggested some options to me. That through his connections I could go to serve at the Black see, that it would be good 
there. But everything's OK with him now, we get along perfectly well.
Indeed, earlier studies by Kay (2006) and Eichler (2012) have shown that militarized notions of 
masculinity have not lost their meaning among men who have done military service or work(ed) in 
the armed forces. The interviewees' fathers had grown up and served in the Soviet period when, as 
Yurii put it,”the military had a totally different character than now”, and soldiering was a central 
component of male identity. This helps explain why they had hoped that their sons too would pass 
the so-called 'second school for men'. However, even though many of the interviewees had clearly 
acted against their fathers' will and expectations, none of them reported that this had led to harsh 
sanctions. Hence, the field returns appear to confirm Lokshin and Yemtsov's (2005: 16) previous 
finding  that  ”[p]resence  of  professional  military personnel  in  the  family  shows  no  statistically 
significant influence on the probability to serve. This may suggest that having their children enlisted 
as rank-and-file soldiers is not an attractive option even for the families of military officers.”
The interviewees' mothers, on the contrary, never wanted their son to serve. Anton exemplifies this 
in the following: ”Mom was ardently against service in the military”. Dima grew up surrounded by 
women who, according to him, had a negative attitude towards military service: ”Everyone was in  
favour of me not going there.” In many cases, like in Ilya's above, mothers help young men with the 
draft process and facilitate service avoidance. Usually this means collecting medical documents that 
prove that the son has one of the illnesses that guarantee a postponement or deferment of military 
service.
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According to  Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2002), saving men – whether it is the husband from 
alcoholism or the son from abuse in the military – is often seen as women's social duty in Russia. 
Women's (re)productive role thus implies that they provide active care and protection for the family 
members. In Caiazza's (2002) view, this gender expectation is also the reason why the Committee of 
the  Soldiers'  Mothers  has  won public  support  and sympathy for  their  cause;  the activists  have 
managed to utilize traditional ideas about motherhood and women, which suggest that mothers are 
supposed to be protective of their sons. Hence, it is not surprising that the interviewees' mothers  
and, in some cases, also girlfriends, had taken the role of defender and protector of the young men's 
interests.
According to Freire (1974: 7), ”[c]hoice is illusory to the degree it represents the expectations of 
others”.  What was strongly emphasized among the interviewees was that the choice whether to 
serve or not had been their own, despite both resistance and support among their family members. 
In Anton's words:
Yes, there are mothers [who do not want their sons to serve], but you understand, one does not want to feel like some kind 
of a mama's boy. That your mom defines your destiny. To join or not to join the military, I always made the decision myself.
Furthermore, what comes to wider social networks, most of the informants had had only a few, if 
any friends, class mates or acquintances who had served. As a rule, the topic – to serve or not to 
serve – was not discussed among peers because, as Ilya stated, the answer was clear: ”Everybody 
knows already that no, I won't go to the army”.  Also Maksim  indicated that not doing military 
service  had become a  normalized  practice  among  his  friends  and  acquaintances:  ”Usually  the  
question that is discussed is how to avoid it. […] It's already like an established fact that the army  
is, that it's a no.”
Taken together, the majority of the informants reported that they had gotten their families and social  
networks' support to their decision not to serve. According to Maksim: ”Most of my friends and  
relatives  they  all  understand  perfectly  well  that  there's  nothing  good  in  it  [military  service],  
absolutely nothing.” In the interviewees' immediate social environment, it was the fathers that still, 
to  a  considerable  degree,  nurtured  the  traditional  notion  of  soldiering  as  a  masculine  ideal. 
However, their opinion or an interviewee's anxiety about losing his father's acceptance were not 
enough  to  actually  motivate  any of  the  interviewees  to  serve.  Mothers  were  those  whom the 
interviewees usually sought support during the recruitment process. Hence, the immediated social 
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environment did not punish but rather supported and encouraged the interviewees' choice not to 
serve.
5.1.4 Attitudes towards the armed forces and views on military service
In general, the present interviewees  demonstrated mixed views and attitudes towards  the armed 
forces  and  military  service.  None  of  them  had  done  military  service,  and  all  expressed 
unwillingness to serve. However, while some had been determinant and even desperate to avoid 
being drafted, others gave a more indifferent impression of their position towards military service. 
For Misha,”it had always been clear” that he did not want to serve. Maksim stated that ”I can't  
imagine myself in that place, to be honest. That is, it's the kind of social institution where I can't see  
myself.  I can imagine myself anywhere, even in war, but not in the army.” Yurii, on the contrary, 
indicated that the issue of military service had not been of great significance to him:”I did not set  
myself a goal when I was born not to join the army. For me it was somehow all the same. If it turns  
out  well,  I  won't  go.  If  it  doesn't,  I  will.”  Nevertheless,  it  should  be  noted  that  despite  the 
indifference expressed in  the quotation above,  Yurii  had not  remained passive but  taken active 
measures to avoid service.
Further, one of the interviewees worked as a volunteer in the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of 
Russia, being the only informant who had decided to take an active stand, join together with like-
minded people and become an activist. Majority of the interviewees viewed the issue of military 
service  as  a  private  matter  and  dealt  with  it  correspondingly;  that  is,  on  their  own.  This  is 
particularly explained by Sasha as such: ”To a certain extent, I took it passively. They [voenkomat]  
don't disturb me, I don't disturb them, well, everything is fine then.”
It is noteworthy that several of the interviewees had, in fact, been willing or interested in joining the 
army in some point, but changed their mind as they came to draft age and the actual recruitment 
process started. For example, Anton had been wanting to go to the military as long as he could 
remember. However, after the draft station misplaced his personal documents, his view changed 
drastically:
That  was the first  time  I  had  to  face  bureaucracy in  our country.  And coldness,  namely military  coldness,  when  a  
conscript's personal history can be lost and the conscript becomes useless. None of my attempts to restore my case were 
successful.  […] I really wanted to go to the army but my wish was destroyed by our administrative authorities, our  
government, our corruption, coldness and so on.
54
Anton's  narrative  above  demonstrates  how  the  military's  perceived  inefficency,  inhuman 
bureaucracy and corruption, that lead to disregard for individual, often contribute to young men's 
unwillingness to serve. Another factor that made military service less attractive in the interviewees' 
eyes,  was the abuse of conscripts.  Many of the interviewees mentioned  dedovshchina,  violence 
against new conscripts. Also stories about conscripts who had been forced to  plough a vegetable  
garden  or build a summer cottage for generals.  Hence, the field returns suggest that awareness 
about unreasonable and arbitrary practices in the army also plays a central role in the formation of 
the negative attitudes towards military service.
The interviewees stated that military service had had both a positive and negative influence on their 
relatives, friends or acquaintances, who had served. Even though the field returns were dominated 
by negative perceptions, many interviewees highlighted also positive influences of military service. 
Recurrent issues  ranged  from developing  one's  physical  condition,  learning  to  use  a  gun  or 
parachuting to making life-long friends. Thus, to some extent, army life was considered fascinating, 
interesting  and  exciting  by  the  interviewees.  This  was  expressed,  for  example,  by  Ilya  in  the 
following way: ”Somewhere deep down at heart I actually maybe wanted to become a soldier.  
Watching movies, and they have it cool [laughs]. But that's somewhere deep down at heart.”
Like  the  draftee-respondents  of  Klement'ev  and  Nikolaeva's  (2000)  survey  study,  the  present 
interviewees' perceptions about military service were contradictory. This can perhaps be explained 
by the gap between, on the one hand, the images, representations and myths of army life and the 
Russian/Soviet soldier, (re)constructed in popular culture and official discourses and, on the other 
hand, accounts from people who have really served in the Russian military.  As Kvale has noted 
(1996: 33): ”The contradictions of interviewees […] may in fact be adequate reflections of objective 
contradictions in the world in which they live.” From Ilya's narrative above, movies made military 
service seem 'cool'. However, the letters his brother had sent home from the army gave a totally 
different impression:”It was really tough. […] From his letters it became clear that all of it was  
totally useless.”
Further, it is worth noting that none of the informants was categorically against the military. This 
observation is illustrated by Yurii as such:  ”Naturally, we have to have an army”. Anton's view, 
which according to Kay's (2006: 66) earlier observations is shared by many contemporary Russians, 
was that:”I am for military service, but I am for service in a normal army.” Thus, the field returns 
confirm Eichler's (2012: 81) previous claim that ”men who evaded the draft are not necessarily 
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antimilitaristic”. Of  all  the  present  interviewees,  only  Maksim  considered  himself  a  pacifist. 
However,  subscribing to the idea that war is  inevitable126,  he indicated that  a certain degree of 
political realism was needed:  ”Well, a pacifist as I understand it, that is, people who are against  
war. Against violence, against war. Of course. It's my position. But absence of war is already a  
utopia.”
Without an exception, all the interviewees called for a professional army where service would be on 
voluntary (contract) basis. Several informants emphasized that everyone, who served, should be 
dedicated  professionals,  not  merely  an  unmotivated  mass  of  people  forced  through  a  training 
regimen. Hence, none of the interviewees objected to military service as such, but to the fact that it  
was obligatory; that is, that the conscription system was coercive. In the field data, conscription was 
refered to as a human rights violation. This perception of conscription as being unjust was further 
emphasized by comparisons with slavery and serfdom.  For example, Viktor saw the conscription 
system as merely a way to make money on people by using them as free work force, echoing the 
view of the majority of Russians (Mikhailenok 2006: 113). In other words, the state was seen to 
exploit people through obligatory military service. Furthermore, many interviewees saw the military 
as a producer of obedient and uncritical citizens, something which was seen to serve the interests of 
those in power. In Ilya's words:  ”It's probably useful for the government that they teach people  
there.. not to think but just perform some monotonous operations.”
5.2 Defining one's self
As discussed in the previous chapter, identity as self-identification ”tells us who we are and what 
we do” (O'Hagan 2009: 28). Hence, the present interviewees' choice not to join the army can be 
understood as a manifestation of their sense of self. Further, Goff & Dunn (2009b: 244-245) argue 
that: 
Even though  identity  is  a  social  construction,  it  is  not  whatever  we  want  it  to  be.  A limited  reserve  of  discursive  
resources constrains the ways in which identities evolve, suggesting that domestic history and material circumstances,  
among other things, fix the parameters within which identities can develop.
This implies that also the present interviewees'  identities are contextual products;  they are both 
126 The notion of inevitability of war, introduced by Lenin, had a strong influence on Soviet thinking about war and peace. On the 
official discursive level, the USSR declared pacifism and its mission for world peace. At the same time, however, some wars 
were interpreted as inevitable, justified and progressive, which served as a rationale for the militarization of the country. (see 
Vigor 1975).
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limited and enabled by the specific historical and cultural context, and the material opportunities 
and challenges that the young men are faced with. Further, the interviewees' self-definitions are 
anchored in existing notions of masculinities, that is, accepted ways of being a male in the new 
Russia. In other words, in coming to terms with their sense of self, the interviewees make use of 
discourses and masculinity models that are available in their social setting (see Connell 2000: 12).
In the subsequent section, I will discuss what kind of elements were central to the interviewees' self-
identification and how they have played a role in draft-avoidance.
5.2.1 Capitalist masculinities
In a market society, life centers around work, and work is a socially legitimate masculine activity. 
Surviving the competition for the best jobs requires acquisition of competence, something which is 
manifest also in masculinity notions (e.g. Lehtonen 1995: 118). According to Koukarenko, (2007: 
105),  with  the  transition  to  the  market  system,  professionalism has  become one of  ”[t]he  new 
discursive means for constructing masculinities” in the post-Soviet Russia (see also Eichler 2012). 
This was evident in my field returns, too; many of the interviewees emphasized the meaning of 
education for them, and identified themselves as professionals. Also several of those who did not 
explicitly refer to themselves as professionals, underlined the importance of work, as well as being 
good at what they did and successful in that field they had chosen.
What  is  noteworthy  from  the  viewpoint  of  draft-avoidance,  is that  the  interviewees'  self-
identification as career-making professionals appeared to happen at the expense of military service. 
For example, for Yurii it was clear why he was investing in career:  ”Yes. Because in general, the  
military  is  for  one  year,  but  work  is  for  the  whole  life.”  Further, in  several  field  narratives, 
professionalism served as the main rationale against joining the army. This was indicated by Dima 
and Misha in the following terms:
I am not a professional soldier, it's not what I do. I have my thing, that's what I work with. And that's all. (Dima)
Somebody has to defend the motherland,  but it  has to be done by soldiers  who get  money for  doing it.  Those who  
defend have to be professionals. I don't consider myself a professional. (Misha)
Hence,  in  the  field  narratives,  professionalism  and  military  service  were  constructed  as  two 
incompatible, mutually excluding paths, even ways of life, and joining the army conflicted with the 
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interviewees' self-identification as professionals.
Furthermore, a goal-oriented businessman is often seen as  one of the most dominant masculinity 
ideals of the new, capitalist Russia (Meshcherkina 2000). This was,  however, not how any of  my 
interviewees  refered  to  themselves  even  though  almost  half  of  them had  education  in  typical 
business fields:  economics,  marketing,  financing,  commerce.  That  notwithstanding, most  of  the 
interviewees emphasized  certain  emerging  male  attributes  that  are  central  to  capitalism;  being 
motivated, and goal- and future-oriented. This was exemplified by Oleg in the following terms:
If  there are some concrete  goals  towards which  one strives,  it's  not  important  what  they  are  but  he  will  already be
something more than many other people. […] That's what in my view, from my point of view a real man has concrete goals  
and results.
Oleg described the emerging masculinity ideal further: ”The characteristic of a man is success. [...]  
Now, money is the measure.”  Indeed, as Ruchkin (1998) points out, money is one of the main 
values of market society. Consequently, as Oleg's narrative highlighted, being a man in a capitalist 
system is, to a considerable degree, about striving for success and making money, the two being 
closely tied together. Also Sasha, who did not have higher academic education and stressed less the 
meaning of professionalism than many other interviewees, identified himself as a money-maker: ”I  
simply think that I am supposed to live, make money for myself and my family and try.. to live well..  
by more or less honest means. And that's about it.”
Considering  the  socio-economic  reality  in  today's  Russia,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  the 
interviewees prioritized work over military service. On the one hand, the country's economy has 
witnessed a remarkable growth during the past years, as a result of which there are more billionaires 
in Moscow than in any other city in the world. However, at the same time, a large part  of the 
population is struggling to make the ends meet.127 If richness is striking in Russia, so is poverty, too. 
Hence, prioritizing work is to a certain extent a question of survival. It is about trying to make sure 
that one does not end up on the less fortunate side of the society in the competition where there is a 
lot to lose. However, as some interviewees pointed out, the chances for huge success are also much 
greater in Russia than, for example, in Northern Europe.




towards  the  'good  life'  which,  to  a  significant  degree,  entails  financial  security  and  material 
comforts. In Anton's words: ”a good car, a house, holidays abroad, and so on”. The qualities that 
were  mentioned  in  the  field  narratives  and  that  the  interviewees  identified  themselves  with  – 
professionalism as competence, goal- and future-orientation, investing in work and career – are a 
response to the challenges and opportunities of the market society. Expected to guarantee success, 
embracing and idealizing those qualities is part of the survival strategy.
5.2.2 The family man
It  is  noteworthy  that  even  though  the  interviewees'  identities  were,  to  a  considerable  degree, 
anchored on capitalist notions of masculinity, the ideal of money and career making professional 
was also met with certain reservations. For example, Ilya stated that he ”did not necessarily agree” 
with  the  general  attidude in  the society that  stressed making money,  and buying a  car  and an 
apartment as the criteria of manliness. Also, Anton stood out as en exception. In several occasions, 
he emphasized the meaning of the private sphere and family. He stated that outer measures, such as 
position or success in the public realm of work,  were of secondary importance to him; he wanted 
first and foremost to be a family leader and a man whom others could count on:
You know, a real man is first and foremost a person who can give protection to his near and dear ones. Different kinds of 
protection, physical, material, emotional protection. Who can be a real leader of the family, the head, and is ready to  
maintain that family. That's probably what for me is an example of a real man. Here it's not important what kind of a status  
he has, his stading in the society, whether he's been in the army or not, education. […] Being that kind of a man is what I 
want to aim at.
During  the  Soviet  period,  the  state  took  control  over  people's  private  lives,  which  meant  that 
Russian men were stripped of their traditional role as the head of family. However, as  the Soviet 
system collapsed and with it the social safety net provided by the state, men were expected to fill  
the void and take over the traditional male duties of breadwinner and leadership. Hence, the post-
Soviet era has witnessed a return to traditional gender notions, which has included the restitution of 
the patriarchal role to men. (Ashwin 2000: 18-20; Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2007; Tartakovskaya 
2005: 133). Now, as a result, ”the household is an important sphere in which men [can] potentially 
gain a sense of efficacy and identity”. Further, according to Ashwin & Lytkina, ”there are few other 
tasks in the urban Russian household that are seen as masculine” as that of breadwinner. (Ashwin & 
Lytkina 2004: 189).
Anton's narrative reflects this shift, and the on-going rehabilitation of traditional family values. In 
59
other words, his masculine self-identification is strongly informed by neotraditionalist discourses 
and practices. According to Ashwin (2000), ”women seem to be looking for two things from men: 
financial security, and emotional and practical support within the family”. These are the gender 
expectations that also Anton indicated he sought to live up to – at the expense of military service.
5.2.3 Embracing individualism
Further, the field narratives reflected yet another value that is characteristic of market society, as 
well as capitalist notions of masculinities; especially individualism. In the Soviet era, the army was 
a central institution in consolidating collectivism, that is, ”the priority of common interests over 
individual interests” (Gudkov 2006: 46). Consequently, ”the experience of military service was one 
of subordinating oneself to the collective, respecting hierarchies, and following orders” (Eichler 
2012: 25).  Hence, individualism represents the opposite to the logic and official values of Soviet 
society as a whole, and the military in particular. As expressed in the field narratives, the ethos of 
individualism implies that individual needs, wants and aspirations are taken as the starting point for 
every pursuit, while the needs of the state and society are a distant second.128 Oleg's words captured 
the attitude: ”To be honest, if I saw some practical personal benefit in the army, I would go there.”  
Maksim stated similarly that:”I just did not see in it anything productive from my own viewpoint.”  
It  was namely this  perceived lack  of  personal  benefit  that  made the  interviewees  call  military 
service useless, a lost year or a sheer waste of time.
Embracing individualism and the idea that a man is allowed, and even supposed, to follow his own 
aspirations and live for himself, and not for the state, offered thus the interviewees yet another 
rationale for not doing military service. As Maksim stated: ”I just don't want to, so why should I  
serve in the army?” Misha suggested that it would be for the benefit of everyone  if the issue of 
military service was considered first and foremost from the individual's perspective:  ”I believed 
that I can use those two years on something else. And not just for myself but, I don't know, and for  
others, because why should you do what you don't like?” Further, he added that the military as an 
institution that aims to make everyone fit the same  standard contradicted the values he had been 
socialized to from little:
I don't like that […] they try to equalize everyone. That you are like everyone, you are simply flock, you're a pawn. I've 
always liked the idea that everyone can be something special and individual. And to say, from childhood I was raised to 
think that you don't have to be like everyone else. Well, maybe this also was a reason [for not wanting to join the army].
128 See also Webber and Zilberman's study (2006).
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Also other interviewees named the military's inability, or unwillingness, to take individual needs 
into account as a problem. They claimed that not everyone could eat the same food and do exactly 
the same exercises without somebody falling ill or getting hurt. Hence, the 'mass' nature of military 
service was seen to be the underlying reason for the numerous scandals and problems that the 
Russian armed forces have struggled with in the post-Soviet era. For Maksim, this was one of the 
main factors that made the military as an institution highly unattractive for him, and he demanded 
that the army should be more individual-oriented.
The  field  returns  thus  support  Petrov's  (2003)  previous  claim that  one  of  the  explanations  for 
growing draft-avoidance  can  be found in the rise  of  individualism,  that  is,  the changing value 
system  and  young  men's  tendency  to  emphasize  personal  profit  at  the  expense  of  the  state's 
interests. Furthermore,  what  was  important  from the  present  interviewees'  perspective  was that 
embracing  an  individualist  masculinity  notion  allowed  them  to  oppose  to  the  collectivist  and 
submissive mentality of 'server of the motherland', which the state tries to impose on them. In other 
words, individualism appeared to liberate the men from the imperative of common interests.  As 
Viktor stated: ”Everybody should live for themselves, not for the motherland.”
5.2.4 Self-made men
Another central element in the interviewees' narratives was their self-identification as independent, 
autonomous, self-reliant and self-sufficient men. According to Koukarenko (2007: 105), the idea of 
a self-made man has been important for post-Soviet masculinities; indeed, in it culminate all the 
main qualities that are required from a succesful man in the new market society, where dependence 
on the state is no longer possible (see Meshcherkina 2000). This is further explained by Dima in the 
following terms:
Life is harder now, in a whirl. And work is harder, it's not like in the Soviet Union when you knew for sure that after  
finishing studies you'll be sent somewhere and you'll work there peacefully 10 or 15 years, if you had to do anything at all. 
You knew your life clearly, life was calm. Now it's not like that.
Dima's statement illustrates how the social contract between the state and citizens, which existed in 
the Soviet period, is no longer applicable (Eichler 2012: 80). Instead, the new market society forces 
one to rely on oneself, to be economically self-sufficient. As Ruchkin (1998) observed already 15 
years ago, responding to the post-Soviet changes and transition to capitalism, young Russians have 
embraced the ideal of self-reliance. This was clearly indicated also in my field returns.
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My interviewees appeared to have responded to the challenges posed by the market system by 
making a virtue of their ability to cope alone.  They particularly used the narrative of  how much 
harder  life  was  now compared to  before  to  construct  a  self-image of  a  self-made man,  which 
appeared to give them a sense of dignity. This was noticeable especially in the ways they reminisced 
about  the  period  when they took their  first  steps  towards  independent  life.  Several  informants 
argued that, if before military service was the rite of passage into manhood and adulthood, now the 
qualifying test for many young Russian men had the transition from one's parents' house to self-
sufficiency and independence. This was exemplified by Ilya and Anton in the following terms:
That's  a  school  [of  life]  when  you  move  to  a  new,  unknown  city,  where  there's  nobody  waiting  for  you,  where  
nobody needs you but somehow you have to try to develop there. (Ilya)
Now the school of life is...  somewhat different. For me the school of life was when I left  home at the age of 17 and
started to provide for myself on my own. I had great difficulties finding accomodation, finding a job... I was studying so 
there was not much time. I also had to organize my private life, I wanted to have some kind of a love.. For me this period, 
let's say from 18 to 20 years, these two years were my school of life during which I understood a lot, from which I got a lot. 
(Anton)
Viktor's comment indicates that, for him and his peers, self-sufficiency and independence are  the 
ultimate parameters of manliness.  At  the same time,  he questioned the common claim that  the 
military turns 'boys' into 'men':
Where did the get that nonsense from that the army makes a man?! How?! Just explain to me in detail how.. That you are 
separated from your mom, like they say, you live independently.. I'm hardly 18, I provide for myself, I don't take money from  
anyone, I live totally independently. So what are they talking about? (Viktor)
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, in the interviewees' narratives, self-sufficiency was used as a 
justification for their demand for autonomy from the state's interference with their private lives, as 
well as an argument for not having to serve in the army. For example, as Viktor boldly stated: ”I 
don't  owe anyone  anything. […]  Why should I  serve anyone? I  am a free man!”  Also  Sasha's 
experience was that he”had not gotten anything from the state.” Hence, he was convinced that the 
right to control his life was his own, not the state's: ”In my opinion I belong first and foremost to  
myself and not to Russia even though I am a Russian citizen.”
5.2.5 Empowering male identity?
Post-Soviet Russia has witnessed a growing influence of western norms and values, which has had a 
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significant impact on gender notions (e.g. Ashwin 2000: 18; Eichler 2012: 67). This is evident also 
in the present field data. As the discussion above demonstrates, the interviewees' identities are to a 
significant degree reflective of capitalist  notions of masculinity that emphasize professionalism, 
goal-orientation, individualism, success, money and material well-being. Equally, their sense of self 
is informed by the liberal values of independence, autonomy, self-reliance and self-suffiency, which 
were discouraged, even taboos in the Soviet era (Koukarenko 2007;  Zdravomyslova & Temkina 
2007).  Hence,  the  field  returns  appear  supportive  of  Semenova & Utkina  (2004) and Eichler's 
(2012) previous claims that the new, emerging masculinity notions undermine or have replaced the 
military as a crucial element for constructing and expressing male identity.
Gender  identity  can  be  particularly  empowering  if  it  supports  independent  choices  and  an 
autonomous life. The masculinity notions that the present interviewees had embraced and looked up 
to  did  not  encourage  submissiveness,  obedience  and  passivity.  Precisely,  because  they  were 
substantially  oriented  towards  own  decision  making, independence  and  autononomy,  both  in 
personal, economic and political issues. Furthermore, the interviewees' self-perception appeared to 
give  them  a  basis  from  which  to  challenge  old  power  relations;  that  is,  men's  expected 
subordination to  the  needs  of  the  state  and  the  collectivity.  Hence,  supportive  of  individual 
initiatives and pursuits, the interviewees' sense of self can be seen as liberating and empowering.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, work was a  "legitimate sphere for [men's] self-realisation” and 
thereby central to masculine identity in the Soviet era (Kiblitskaya 2000: 98; Ashwin 2000: 12-13). 
Also the present interviewees emphasized the meaning of the sphere of work for them. However, 
the fundamental  difference between the Soviet  and the contemporary Russian seems to be that 
whereas men served the state through work before, now it has become a means to gain and express 
self-reliance and independence. In other words, the interviewees were not working for the state, but 
for themselves. This made work an expression of individualism, not subordination to the collective. 
Through their  work,  men felt  liberated and unencumbered by the demands of the state.  In this 
calculation, military service was seen as opposite to real work129. For example in Dima's view, being 
a soldier was easier than "selling flowers on the street”.
5.3 Othering conscript soldiers
As  discussed  in  chapter  4,  identity  is  a  relational  construct.  In  other  words,  people  define 
129 For comparison, see Ahlbäck's (2010) study about conscription resistance in interwar-Finland.
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themselves as being similar or different only in relation to other individuals, groups and ideas (e.g.  
Connolly 2002). This makes self-definition a boundary-marker in relation to others. In terms of 
male identity formation and definitions, the boundaries often relate to and concern other men. The 
present interviewees routinely compared themselves to their peers who were going to or had already 
done military service. While explaining why they think some young men join the military, they did 
not only outline what set them apart from young men who serve, but also justified their own draft-
avoidance.  The subsequent section thus discusses how the interviewees specifically viewed and 
compared themselves with those are drafted, and how simultaneously identities are constructed and 
defined in everyday life.
5.3.1 Uneducated, ignorant and submissive
In the field narratives, conscript soldiers were described first and foremost as uneducated or poorly  
educated – something which is not surprising since the majority of draftees do not have higher 
education (e.g. Lokshin & Yemtsov 2005). Enrolment in higher education guarantees a deferment, 
making it one of the main division lines and boundary markers between those who serve and those 
who avoid the draft. However, being uneducated was not seen merely as a lack of formal (higher) 
education,  but  doubts were also raised about  the draftees'  intellectual  abilities.  For example,  in 
Maksim's view, those who are not clever enough to study, are drafted:
What is the army now? People who do not study go there, who were not accepted to study. It's kind of clear that in our time  
entering any institution of higher education is not that difficult. It's not that difficult. In any case you can study. Let's say 
that not the most intelligent people find themselves there [in the military].
Moreover, the interviewees depicted those who serve as  poorly informed, particularly in terms  of 
their own rights as citizens. This was exemplified by Ilya in the following terms:
Many are convinced that everything is decided for them, that the state says, and you have to go. It does not even cross their  
minds that they have some rights, that the way they are used is totally against the law. […] Well, in this sense poorly  
educated people.
Indeed, according to Webber and Zilberman (2006: 190-191), the vast majority of draftees come 
from socially disadvantaged backgrounds and are thus ”least likely, in principle, to be aware of their 
rights and the means by which they can go about protecting them”. Nevertheless, it was further 
implied in the field narratives that being poorly informed about their rights was, at least partly, the 
draftees'  own fault.  As Viktor stated:  ”They are simply people who don't think much.” In other 
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words, conscripts were depicted as people who did not, in general, reflect on their circumstances or 
exercise critical thinking, and this was seen to be the main reason why they 'ended up' in the army;  
ignorance led to a submissive mentality and an accepting attitude towards military service. Several 
interviewees stated that the submissiveness, obedience and passivity were only reinforced by the 
experience of military service. According to Viktor, he had seen many young men return from the 
army ”with downtrodden heads”.
However, the interviewees indicated that they themselves were the opposite. They did not take for 
granted that the state had the right to demand them to serve. They disliked to be told what to do and 
were not willing to submit to others' rule and follow orders, in or outside the military. Hence, a 
boundary marker was established between the interviewees and those young men who did not resist  
the draft. This was particularly exemplified by narratives from Sasha and Maksim as such:
I am not some kind of a cyborg that is programmed to protect the motherland and die. That is, you have to at least think for  
yourself. (Sasha)
There [in the military] you have to do what you are told. Always. That is,  they always decide for you. You will never
decide for yourself. There are people who like that, for whom it is easier to live like that. And they go there deliberately. But  
I am not one of them. (Maksim)
In  his  study  on  military  service  resistance  in  South  Africa,  Conway  (2008:  134)  argues  that 
”[m]any objectors considered their self-reflexivity and attitude towards conscription as a privilege 
that was denied other white South African men”. Also the present interviewees indicated that they 
saw their own position and ability to avoid military service as advantaged. After all,  they were 
aware of and demanded their rights as citizens, and exercised critical thinking towards conscription. 
At the same time, those young men who did military service were depicted as disadvantaged and 
disempowered  by  their  condition.  Their  lack  of  information  and  reflexivity  translated  into  a 
submissive attitude towards the conscription system. Indeed, access to information is crucial for 
empowerment (World Bank 2002). Many interviewees noted that, according to their experience, if 
people were only given enough and the right information, they understood that they could not be 
forced  to  serve.  This  again  would  lead  to  the  abolition  of  the  conscription  system.  As  Viktor 
stated:”If you explain everything knowledgeably in detail, people will understand [that conscription  
is wrong].”
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5.3.2 Unfit for the market society
Moreover, young men, who were drafted and served, were further described by the interviewees as 
people who do not know what they want and who have not found their place in life; they do not 
have goals of their own, lack initiative, and simply ”do not want anything more”. In other words, 
draftees were seen as people without self-direction, that is, aspirations, ambitions and dreams of 
their own making. This was understood to be the yet another reason why some ended up in the 
military.  According to Oleg,  ”those who do not have any concrete goals join the military. If they  
had a goal, they would not want to waste their time on it. That's it.”
Further, in Dima's view, military service produced people who had difficulties in operating in the 
civilian life, the 'real' life. His observation was that those, who had been in the army, were good at 
fulfilling simple tasks assigned by others, but less capable of creative and independent thinking. 
However,  he underlined that self-direction and the ability to think independently and creatively 
were the most basic needs if one wished to get by, or even more so, to become successful in today's 
Russia.  In other  words,  the experience of military service was seen to undermine young men's 
chances to harvest the promises of the new market-based society. The was particularly exemplified 
in the following narrative:
I have an acquaintance, both a relative and an acquaintance, who was in the army. He was relatively lucky, without 
any kind of help or anything. He matured, he... became stronger and obtained manly qualities of character.. But he's 
having a really hard time now. That is, he finished the service this year, and now he's having a hard time. He..  
Because the army is understandable. The army is clear, understandable, predictable and unproblematic as a matter 
of fact. If you don't run into some kind of trouble, it's unproblematic. And there.. you do not pratically need to think. 
The army denies you the possibility, the wish to think. You have everything according to a schedule, clearly according  
to a script, you know the questions and the answers. In life, it's not like that. […] That's why it's now so difficult for 
him  to  make  up  his  mind  about  going  to  college,  work  and  the  rest.  That  is,  he  got  used  to  a  simple  and  
comprehensible life. (Dima)
In the Soviet planned economy, people's destinies were decided for them. As Meshcherkina (2000) 
has  noted,  the  new  competitive  society  requires  initiative,  resourcefulness,  alertness  and 
decisiveness. The market system rewards those with ambition, and to be a man is to be an achiever. 
In the view of the interviewees, a soldier's qualities were not only seen as corresponding poorly to 
the  requirements  of  today's  society;  in  fact,  they  were  seen  to  be  contradictory.  A soldier,  as 
someone  good  at  monotonous  performance  of  certain  routine  tasks,  as  well  as  receiving  and 
following orders, but lacking aspirations of his own, was somewhat the antithesis of a successful 
and admirable Russian man and the masculinity ideals that the interviewees had adopted.
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5.3.3 Ridiculous and pathetic boys
Another way the informants created distance between themselves and those who are drafted was by 
pointing to how little respect and honouring the contemporary Russian Armed Forces and soldiers 
evoke. According to Dima, 23rd February, the Day of the Defender of the Fatherland, is commonly 
taken as a joke and people celebrate it as Men's day, an equivalent of 8th March130 that does not have 
any relation  to  the  military.  Moreover,  the  interviewees  stated  that,  during  celebratory military 
parades or other holidays dedicated to the armed forces, participating soldiers were seen as being 
merely  ridiculous.  Instead  of  arousing  admiration  and  being  looked  up  to  as  heroes  of  the 
fatherland, they were perceived more like losers who had achieved little in life; ”people who do not  
have anything in their lives besides the army”.  This was particularly exemplified by Ilya in the 
following narrative:
I don't know if you saw the 2nd of August, the Day of the VDV131? It's a kindergranten, really. Grown men drinking beer and 
lying in the fountain, taking a bath there.. Well, they went to the military, and it seems to be the only meaningful experience 
they've had in life. And now they of course recall everything that was good there, that it was cool to be in the military, new 
friends, that everything was great there. And every year they wait for this day in order to drink themselves unconscious, 
and then destroy something. Well, it's not serious, it's ridiculous. The whole city, everywhere people laugh at them.
5.3.4 Soldier – the unadmired Other
Male identity work is often performed through association of difference with other men. In the 
narratives  presented  here,  the  interviewees'  attempt  to  differentiate  themselves  from  conscript 
soldiers became clear. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the armed forces has lost a lot of 
its old prestige and glory, and so has the role of a soldier – something which the statements from the 
present interviewees also echo.
According to Russian sociologist Igor Kon (2002: 239), the image of the contemporary Russian 
soldier is that of a weak and helpless boy, bullied by his seniors and protected by his mom132. Even 
though several interviewees insisted that they did not see military service as an important social 
marker,  something  which  defines  a  person's  value,  their  views  on  conscripts  were  far  from 
complimentary133.  In  fact,  draftees  seemed  to  represent  a  kind  of  antihero  to  the  present 
interviewees, which was captured by Dima in the following words:  ”You can say that those who  
130 The International Women's Day is one of the most popular holidays in Russia.
131 The airborne troops, considered to be the elite unit in the Russian Armed Forces.
132 I was once told by a young Russian woman that in girls' eyes, a guy who had ”dodged the draft” often appeared cooler than those 
who had served. Nevertheless, none of my interviewees refered to service avoidance as a ”cool thing to do”.
133 Of all the interviewees, Anton had the most positive attitude towards military service and the armed forces in general. He was  
the only ony who underlined of being proud of those young men who wanted to serve voluntarily. In fact, his perceptions were  
more negative towards those who avoid service than towards draftees.
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haven't managed, who haven't succeeded, who haven't been lucky in life, they find themselves in the  
army”. Taken together, in the interviewees' narratives, draftees were described as lacking all the 
qualities that the new socio-economic context requires from those who want to prosper.
Connolly (2002: xiv) has noted that identity ”is always connected to a series of differences that help 
it to be what it is. The initial tendency is to describe the differences on which you depend in a way 
that gives privilege to you.” Against this background, the unflattering accounts that the interviewees 
gave on those who serve become understandable. Usually, though not always, we strive for positive 
self-identifications that empower us; that is, rather than wanting to put ourselves down, we seek 
dignity. For the same reason the present interviewees also sought to demonstrate the righteousness 
of their viewpoint and choices. Simultaneously, those, who did not resist the draft and served, lost 
status and became devalued and othered.  Furthermore,  according to Meshcherkina (2000: 106), 
”[i]n  post-communist  Russia,  horizontal  relations  between  individual  men  have  assumed  a  far 
greater importance, and now men who want to succeed have to define their position in relation to 
their peers”. Hence, the field narratives can also be seen as reflective of competition between young 
men.
5.4 Empowerment or disempowerment?
As discussed in chapter 2, in the Soviet period, the military had an important function as a 'social 
lift' that enabled both horizontal and vertical mobility opening new life prospects for young men 
from all social backgrounds (Mikhailenok 2006: 106-109; Gudkov 2006: 41). Many of the present 
interviewees did note that military service can still have a positive influence on lives and provide 
opportunities for social mobility for some people. This was expressed by Ilya and Anton in the 
following ways:
In villages, as far as I understand, persists the conviction that in the army you can, that the army is a a way to break 
away from your village. That is, many stay, sign a contract, and start accordingly to earn good money, leave to serve 
in an other part of the country. (Ilya)
[…] then there's those people, who do not have choice. That is... well, for example.. you turned 18. You were not  
accepted to study. Finding a job without education is difficult. So where will you go? You'll join the army. There's 
nothing shameful about that. At the same time, you understand that after serving one year, you can stay on contract 
basis and link your destiny to the military and also get paid well. (Anton)
Yurii also indicated that for someone without education, the army could offer the easiest channel to 
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a decent job. In addition, he pointed to the fact that the military's benefit system for contract soldiers 
can help one to realize a dream that  for many Russians seems unreachable today – getting an 
apartment of one's own.
Asked if they thought that they themselves could have achieved something by joining the army, the 
interviewees'  reponses  were,  however,  totally  different  from those  above.  In  other  words, the 
interviewees, like many contemporary Russians, rather saw military service as a 'depriving factor'  
(Mikhailenok 2006), inimical to personal achievement and general efforts at the 'good life'. One of 
the main fears the interviewees articulated was  connected to  the risk of losing one's health, both 
physical and mental. This was conveyed by Maksim, Viktor and Ilya as follows: 
Now, to serve in the army is to cripple oneself. (Maksim)
It [the army] creates softheads and invalids. What kind of people come from there?! Broken! Broken... They have to 
be fixed... (Viktor)
My biggest wish... is that I would return from there physically healthy. (Ilya)
Anton was, yet again, an exception. He underlined that he viewed the army as something ”totally  
normal”, and was convinced that, had he served, he ”would not have brought [with him] anything 
negative from there”.
Another  factor  that  the  interviewees  associated  with  military  service  was  moral,  personal  and 
professional degradation. For example, Ilya, based on what his older brother had told  him  after 
returning from the army, said that:
Also morally it was difficult that.. [the seniors are] younger than you, well it's visible that they are closer to kids, and,  
you know, they are already aggressive towards you, as if they knew something about life and try to teach someone 
something.
Furthermore, Ilya went on to describe the army as an environment without any intellectual stimuli. 
Freetime would be spent  in  front of the television,  watching news from government-controlled 
channels, surrounded by people whose company he doubted would be inspiring and self-fulfilling. 
Summing up,  in  Ilya's  view,  the  army  was a  place where  ”it  is  difficult  to  remain educated”, 
because all the knowledge and skills you have acquired would be  ”intensively hammered out of  
your  head”  and replaced with unhelpful  information  for  civilian  life.  Similar  perceptions  were 
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articulated also by several other interviewees. Hence, the field returns appear to support both Kay 
(2006) and Klement'ev & Nikolaeva's (2000) previous claims that military service is often regarded 
as  a  waste  of  personal  resources  and a  useless  experience  from the  viewpoint  of  civilian  life. 
According to Dima, the problem was that ”the army is not a preparation for the future life”. Taken 
together,  the  present  interviewees'  considered  the  time  spent  in  the  army  to  undermine  the 
acquisition  of  employable  skills,  the  building  of  career,  relevant  networks  and  the  search  for 
concrete job oppportunities.
Moreover,  the fear of personal degradation was connected to the perception that  the army was an 
institution that  denies conscripts opportunities for self-realization. This was particularly expressed 
by Maksim as such:”Simply... in the military you are not allowed to express yourself, fulfil yourself  
somehow.” Also Yurii saw this to be the main issue underlying many young men's negative attitude 
towards military service. He urged the military to take people's personal interests, especially skills 
development, into consideration. In practice, this could mean that, for example, an engineer would 
not have to serve as an ordinary soldier but rather perform task corresponding to his education. In 
Yurii's  view,  if  the  army  managed  to  assure  young  men  that  they  could  continue  to  realize 
themselves; that is, to develop themselves professionally and follow what they found interesting 
also in military service, it would help address the current recruitment problems. He continued that:
When I want to serve with my head, when I want to serve by doing my favourite thing, when I know for sure that after 
completing my education I can learn and not lose skills in the military, then people will sign up.
Summing up, the common perception that, instead of preparing young men for the future, military 
service destroys their life prospects (see Mikhailenok 2006), was dominant among the interviewees. 
It was only those, who, in the interviewees' eyes,  ”do not have other exit” and have little to lose 
that could make something positive out of military service. The interviewees failed to see that the 
army could teach them anything useful or provide any new opportunities for them. It was, rather, 
the opposite; the interviewees feared that they would be deprived of what they already had or were 
about to achieve in life.  Even this was shared by Anton, who was the most positive of all  the 
informants towards military service:
I think many in this country share my opinion that it's at the age of 18 that you should join the military. While, let's say, you  
don't have anything. When you have nothing in your head nor behind your back. But to go to the army when I'm 23, when I 
already have a stable private life and intensive path of development, it does not make any sense because in one year you 
basically lose everything. That's why I basically don't want to go to the army now.
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5.4.1 Oleg's story
Furthermore, it is not only the actual experience of military service that the interviewees described 
and anticipated as disempowering. The mere existence of the conscription system was,  in fact, 
experienced as a constraint to young man's ability to make choices and thus direct his own life.  
Oleg's story is particularly illustrative.
Oleg finished school at the age of 16. Since recruitment to the armed forces starts at 18, he could 
have taken one year off before entering the university. However, instead of encouraging their son to 
first explore and then choose the path he was intersted in, Oleg's parents pressed him to apply for a 
study program that was relatively easy to get admission to – only to make sure that he would avoid 
military service:
When we were applying for the institute, when we met [with friends], there were often jokes about the topic, that if 
you're not accepted, you'll join the army and serve two years there. And with relatives it was the same: if you don't 
get in, you'll go to the army, so you have to get in. Personally, I think that that kind of position is somewhat wrong.
[...] Parents should tell their kids: you have to choose what you like and strive towards it because the earlier you 
define it, the better it will be for you yourself. Here the attitude was different. To get accepted anywhere, just to avoid 
the army.
Oleg explained that the main reason for quickly enrolling in a study program was fear – the fear of 
him losing the sharpness to perform well at the entrance exams. Ultimately, what his parents and he 
himself  were  afraid  of  was  being  recruited  to  the  army.  According  to  Oleg,  due  to  this  fear,  
youngsters have a lot of pressure on them after finishing school, something which prevents them 
from focusing and concentrating on what they really want.
It was easy to see that Oleg was somewhat bitter. The fear of ending up in the military and pressure  
from the family had forced him to choose a path that he could not claim ownership of. The ability to 
lay claim to a decision means self-control, and empowerment. Now he thought he had education in 
an unexciting field. He indicated that he wished things had gone differently:
It's total nonsense! It's five years of life wasted on those studies. Thank God it of course wasn't the worst program 
that could have been.. But to be honest, now I would probably have taken one more year off. I'd rather taken some 
courses, because nobody would have hired me, I wasn't 18 yet. I would have finished a supplementary course, would 
have taken lessons with a private tutor, and then specifically decided where I want to go [to study] and tried to get 
there. And if by then I wouldn't have gotten accepted, then I would have gone there where I managed to.
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Asked if the question about military service had changed his life or its direction, Oleg responded:
Of course, it has changed. Because undoubtedly there was a chance to enter some place else, where I would have 
wanted more. Where the place could have been more to my liking. And not only to my liking but where I could have 
established some interesting and important contacts. […] Right after school, that was the year when I could have 
decided where I specifically want to go. Though I strongly doubt, because at that moment it was really difficult to do. 
But that option, that possibility remains, so it's possible that the army, the necessity to take a quick decision somehow  
influenced.
From the narrative above, Oleg had experienced conscription as a hindrance to exploring the world 
and taking life chances, following dreams and setting on something he really wanted. He felt his 
choices and decisions had been unjustly restricted.
Furthermore, following Parpart, Rai and Staudt (2002a: 4), individual empowerment takes place 
within structural constraints; it implies being able to negotiate and maneuvre impediments, and not 
allow one to be held back by difficulties. Despite the obstacles and challenges that he had met on 
the way, Oleg had continued to pursue his own goals. After finishing studies, he had moved to St. 
Petersburg to follow his passion. Finally, he had found out what he really wanted to do in life: ”I 
like drawing, I know how to draw.”  Now he was working to earn money to come closer to the 
realization of his dream, something which was neither prescribed by his family nor the state. Rather, 
he himself made the decision:
It's not my dream to work in a construction firm, but now it just went that way that first of all one has to think of 
money. But at the same time it's money that can be used on my real dreams. To go to a course, let's say in drawing. I 
know a specific course where I want to go. […] The most important thing is not to stop.
In the word's of Kabeer (2001: 18): ”People who exercise a great deal of choice in their lives may 
be very powerful, but they are not empowered in the sense in which I am using the word, because 
they were never disempowered in the first place.”  Oleg indicated that managing to avoid military 
service had, on the whole, helped to expand his ability to act as an agent, that is, to exercise choice  
and strive for self-defined goals. The fact that the problem with the army had been 'completely 
solved' during the college years meant that Oleg could no longer be drafted. This had earned him a 
new freedom to do whatever he wanted because, unlike many other graduates under 27, his choices 
were no more influenced by the fear of being called to serve. Now, Oleg was taking back what he 
felt he had missed during his years in college. At the same time, he expressed deep satisfaction over 
having  managed  to  avoid  service  and  succesfully  negotiate  for  himself  a  life  he  liked  better: 
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”During these two years [in St. Petersburg], I have broadened my horizons a lot more, I have  
mixed with a huge number of people. Of course, I would not have gotten all this from the army.”
Taken together, the conscription system and military service were constructed in the field narratives 
as disempowering traps. However, exercising agency and becoming empowered implies that one 
continues to pursue self-defined goals despite the environment's opposition and discouragement. As 
the narrative above demonstrated, Oleg had managed to expand his ability to make strategic life 
choices, and strive towards the life he himself wanted. Also Misha's narrative is illustrative of how 
maneuvering structural constraints, that is, mastering the situation and managing to avoid the draft, 
can give one a feeling of satisfaction:
Life was more interesting when I was running from the military. There was excitement in life. Till the age of 27, there was 
an excitement, a risk that somewhere I could be caught, that somewhere the summons could be handed to me, and I'd have 
to show up at voenkomat. The risk was still there. There was the excitement of not getting caught. When I turned 27, the 
excitement was no longer there. It got a little boring [laughs].[…] But of course, in Russia, the military is not a merry 
thing.
5.5 Finding and following one's own path
Besides the issue of masculine identity, the interviewees' narratives suggest the consideration of 
agency. Identity, the sense of self, informs individual self-expression and actions. In other words, it 
can be said that the way men act and exercise agency is a manifestation of their masculine identity 
(see Whitehead 2001: 21). As discussed earlier, the interviewees had adopted a self-identification 
that encouraged an active, autonomous and goal-oriented way of life.
In the subsequent section, I will discuss how the interviewees expressed a strong desire to define the 
direction of their lives, as well as demonstrated the ability set goals, make conscious choices and act 
according to them; in other words, how they exercised agency, and how this related to their draft-
avoidance.
5.5.1 Service avoidance as a conscious choice
Exercising agency is about making strategic life choices, setting goals and being able to pursue 
them (Kabeer  1999;  Kabeer  2001).  The  field  narratives demonstrate  that  for  the  interviewees, 
service avoidance had been a conscious choice, which involved careful consideration of different 
alternatives and opportunity costs. For example, Dima noted that he had seen the military first and 
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foremost as one of many professions. Choosing one's profession, on the other hand, meant to him 
choosing a life style,  something that he claimed one should do consciously.  In his  opinion, his 
”head worked better than the body”, and, consequently, he saw no reason to serve. The decisive 
factor had, however, been the estimation that ”I had and have more prospects outside the army”. 
Oleg had considered the military as one among many possibilities. However, it was not the option 
that  won.  Also for  him,  life  outside the army had appeared to  offer better  and more attractive 
possibilities:
I had these thoughts, 15 percent that I could [join the army] because in principle it does give you something. But then I 
understood that I can get a lot more in the civilian life. Because I knew that those two years I would not be working as a 
shop assistent.
Also Yurii stated that, in most cases, draft-avoidance was a rational choice: ”The majority of those  
guys who refuse from military service, they don't refuse because of fear of going there. Most of them  
have other priorities at that moment.”
According to Misha, if he had been drafted, a plan B would have been implemented. He told that he 
would  have  applied  for  the  military language training  center,  well-known for  its  high  level  of 
foreign language tuition. For a young man who was keen on traveling, had already lived abroad and 
was interested in foreign cultures and languages, the option had its pros. However, the need to resort 
to the alternative strategy never arose, and now he had already passed the draft age. Looking back at 
the years when his future still  was uncertain,  Misha stated: ”Life could have gone in a totally  
different way. But I'm glad it went the way I wanted.”
5.5.2 In search of interesting and meaningful life
Furthermore, many of the interviewees talked at length about the importance of being able to devote 
oneself to something which one truly enjoyed and was good at. Both Misha and Ilya's narratives 
demonstrate this aspiration well:
I  think  that  a  person  should  occupy  himself  with  what  he  wants  and  longs  for.  I  never  had  an  urge  towards  the  
army, or military service. (Misha)
Well, I think what is important to achieve is that you will work with or do something which will be interesting for you. […] 
Those people are interesting who started the first job but already think about the next one, where and how. They have some 
kind of a plan in order to live in their own way. To go for what interests them. (Ilya)
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Further, Ilya indicated that he disliked the idea of choosing what everyone else chose, in his words, 
following ”a standard life pattern” with a job, a car and a wedding. In his view, many people lived 
”totally without any aspiration to make life interesting. I studied, I have to work, and that's all. […]  
And then [many years later] perhaps, they realize that I'm not in the right place”. Finding oneself 
doing the wrong thing in the wrong place, that is, leading an uninspiring life, was something he 
hoped would not happen to him. Like Ilya, Oleg underlined the importance of setting goals as a way 
to self-realization, actualization and achievement. He indicated too that following one's passion was 
what made life meaningful and satisfying: ”Somebody finds a job, a simple one, is not happy with  
it, works there, and that's about it. There's no more to it than that. In general, I don't understand  
what they are living for.”
Joining the army, on the contrary, would have meant accepting an uninspiring path determined by 
someone else. In other words, compulsory military service stood in stark contradiction with the 
interviewees'  search for  a  fulfilling  life.  For  example,  Yurii  had been interested  in  information 
technology as long as he could remember. He was very curious about it and enjoyed learning new 
things:  ”It interested me and I simply had to devote myself  to it.” Military service would have 
meant two years away from what he saw as his career, his life path.
Taken together,  the field narratives suggest  that  the interviewees understood the question about 
military service as closely linked with important life choices. By avoiding the draft, they had thus 
sought to actively direct their lives into a wanted direction.  Further, the narratives above suggest 
that solving the question about military service can become a significant milestone that encourages 
or  even forces  young men to address the following questions:  Who am I?  What  do I  want  to 
become? What kind of life do I want to lead? Being able to answer these questions meant that one 
did not need ready-made answers, like the  military.  As Oleg stated:  ”A person has to have some 
kind of a passion, and then he simply won't need the army.” 
All  the  interviewees  demanded  that  the  choice  whether  or  not  to  serve  should  be  a  personal 
decision,  not  dictated  by the  state.  The right  to  refuse  from service  was  justified  with  liberal-
democratic ideas and values, namely freedom of choice. Moreover, the freedom to choose was not 
seen merely as a question of saying 'yes' or 'no' to military service. The interviewees connected it to 
the wider issue of individual's right to decide what kind of a life he wanted to live. In other words, 
they  insisted  that  everyone  should  have  the  possibility  to  make  important  decisions  and  thus 
determine the  direction of  his/her  own life,  and  making military service  voluntary was part  of 
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guaranteeing  that  that  right  was  respected.  This  was  particularly  exemplified  by  Yurii  in  the 
following terms:
They take you to the military at the age of 18, age of consent. Age of consent doesn't only mean that a person can smoke 
and drink but that he also has the right of choice, right to vote. He can choose the president. If he can choose a crank like 
that who rules the country, why can't he make the choice about what he wants? […] After all, our country is still somewhat 
democratic. […]  Everybody makes the choice for himself and, after all, at 18 you can allow yourself to make the right  
choice.
5.6 Forgetting about the past
Being aware of one's own temporality and context are key elements of critical consciousness (Freire 
1974). In the interviewees' narratives, this was manifested in active reflection on their time and 
place in the contemporary society, especially in relation to the Soviet. Being aware of what had 
changed and what it meant was one of the key themes of the field discussions.
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, state officials, who have been alarmed by the growing draft-
avoidance,  have  tried  to  reinvigorate  young  men's  willingness  for  service  through  patriotic 
education programs134. The project has put a special focus on commemorating the Great Patriotic 
War. Simultaneously, a great effort has been made to build a link between the heroic Soviet-Russian 
past and the military today.
Against this background, it is noteworthy that all the interviewees were very clear and  insistent 
about one issue: one should not confuse the past with the present. Hence, the interviewees rejected 
the  government's  attempts  to  construct  a  continuity  between  the  Soviet  era  and  contemporary 
Russian.  They  underlined  that  it  was  important  to  distinguish,  on  the  one  hand,  between  the 
victories and glory of the Soviet army and veterans, and today's armed forces, conscription system 
and soldiers, on the other. In Sasha's words:  ”They talk about which solder? The soldier that in  
principle does not exist anymore. It was the Soviet soldier, a soldier that was in the Soviet time.” 
The  majority  of  the  interviewees  regarded the  Victory Day as  an  important  –  if  not  the  most  
important – holiday that should be respected. However, they emphasized that no parallels should be 
drawn between the contemporary Russian and the Soviet army. As Dima explains: 
We talk about the 9th May135, talk about the parade there in the Red Square and so on. But it is like a totally different thing. 
134 See chapter 1 for more discussion
135 The Victory Day, the end of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945).
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As if it does not have anything to do with us. […] The holidays are about an other army, not about the contemporary, the 
one we have now. […] Pratically all my relatives were in one way or another touched by the war.. But still, for me it's an 
other army.
Many  interviewees  underlined  that  the  new,  Russian  time  required  professional  armed  forces 
instead of a mass and corrupt army. Yet again, the informants noted that the times have changed and 
the rules that held sway in the Soviet society were not applicable anymore. In their opinion, there 
was no way back to the old times when each and every male citizen uncritically did military service.
5.7 Resisting traditional gender expectations
Social agents operate in constant negotiation with their immediate surroundings (Giddens 1984). 
Often  this  requires  that  the  individual  comes  to  terms  with  the  constraining  aspects  of  social 
structure. The informant young men had not only experienced structural constraints in the form of 
conscription legislation and draft practices. They had also met disapproval and criticism due to their 
choice not to join the army. Often their conduct had been condemned with reference to traditional 
gender norms and expectations. However, as discussed earlier, critical consciousness is one of they 
key aspects of empowerment processes. Only through critical reflection and challenging of common 
sense propositions, and old notions and practices, which are often gendered, individuals can resist 
subordination  and become empowered (Kabeer  2001).  Indeed,  challenging and questioning old 
'truths'  about  masculinity  and  compulsory  military  service  was  a  central  theme  in  the  field 
narratives. It will also be the focus of the subsequent section.
5.7.1 Questioning the male duty
In the Soviet period, men became full citizens through military service (Tartakovskaya 2005: 146). 
However, the citizen-soldier model has been called into question in the post-Soviet  era (Eichler 
2012: 139-140). Beliefs and values play an important role in legitimating suppression and injustice 
(Kabeer 2005: 14). Hence, a process of empowerment often begins from calling them into question. 
Problematizing and challenging the traditional notion of compulsory military service as 'a male duty 
to the motherland' was an important part of the interviewees' argumentation against conscription. 
Some, like Misha, rejected categorically the idea of a duty and the state's right to demand sacrifices 
from the population:  ”I don't  think I  owe anything to my motherland”.  Also Viktor stated that 
”there is no duty to the motherland. Of course not. Because.. what is a motherland? We are all  
individuals. […] I don't like that kind of concepts in principle, like 'duty to the motherland', 'use for  
the fatherland'..” In Ilya's view, the idea that an individual was tied or belonged to one country, was 
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remote and outdated. The world had changed; thus, such concepts as 'duty' had no meaning in the 
new context:
Well, some years ago there was a popular phrase that... Well, a duty to the motherland, but I haven't taken anything from 
the motherland [laughs], so I don't owe anything. In general, it's a dubious duty that you were born on this territory, that 
you owe.. Now the world is like that that you can travel wherever you want. And it does not mean that when you have 
arrived, you right away have to serve there, fulfil a duty because they've accepted you there. Well, I don't know, it's of  
course doubtful.. a duty...
The statements above reflect on-going changes in and struggle about the understanding of what it 
means to be a (male) citizen and member of the society in today's Russia. The interviewees sought 
to define citizenship in liberal-democratic terms; that is, first and foremost through rights that, in the 
their view, belong to the individual automatically. At the same time, they rejected the idea that men 
earn full citizenship through military service.
Other informants focused more on redefining the content of the notion of duty. They questioned the 
presupposition that the only way to help and be of service of one's country was  through military 
service. As Yurii stated: ”You shouldn't say that a person who has not served cannot be a hero of  
the fatherland”. Maksim saw his work with socially disadvantaged children as a much better way of 
making  a  contribution  to  Russia's  future  than digging  ditches  or  shoveling  snow for  a  year. 
According to Dima, the problems in the military and conscription system were far from being the 
most pressing issues in the Russian society. Consequently, claiming that a decent male citizen was 
the one who had served in the army was, in his opinion, not justified:
What is it, to fulfill one's duty to the motherland? […] I am a distinctly Russian person. And one can help one's country in 
different ways. Who helps more, who less is not even something to argue about because everyone looks at it differently. [...]  
It's not necessary to help the state by sitting somewhere in a barrack.
5.7.2 Of course, I am a man!
Despite  the opening up of the society and diversification of gender roles, the Russian power elite 
still seeks to strengthen traditional markers of masculinity, especially military service. Those, who 
have not served, are met with suspicions about their  manliness, something which,  according to 
Conway,  is  typical  for  militarized  states.  (Shaburova 2005:  94;  Conway  2008:  128;  Webber  & 
Zilberman 2006: 175-176). Not only the current political leadership but also many ordinary people 
continue to subscribe to the traditional views that, in order to become a 'real'  man, a youngster 
should serve as the military is a school of life for men. According to Maya Eichler (2012):
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Every year hundreds of thousands of young men in Russia must confront the following dilemma: should I risk life and limb 
by heeding the draft call, or avoid the brutality and pain of Russian army life but take the chance of being seen as less of a 
man?
Many of the present interviewees had indeed met negative attitudes with regard to their decision not 
to serve. For example, the father of Anton's ex-girlfriend, a professional soldier of high rank, had 
turned cold towards him after finding out that he had not been in the military. However, Eichler's 
dilemma seems somewhat exaggerated. Rather, the field narratives suggest that many young men in 
Russia have moved beyond the question; several of my interviewees simply refused to recognize the 
dilemma Eichler  (2012) refers  to.  They did  not  seem hesitant  about  whether  they should  have 
served or not, but stood firmly behind the decision. Also, the political leaders' rhetorics that seek to 
link manliness and soldiering, and make young men feel uncomfortable for not having served in the 
army, had had little influence on them, or the influence was the opposite of what had been intended. 
Majority  of  the  present  interviewees  stated  that  they  usually  disregarded  people who  made 
traditionalist claims about military service and manliness. They were seen as people whose opinion 
did not bother or matter – old grannies or uneducated girls from the countryside. As Oleg explained:
Well, perhaps a couple of people said that a man has to serve in the military, for example like that. But I was not 
interested in their opinion, to be honest. […] It seems to me that people who talk like that understand and take this 
question very superficially. It's a very primitive position.
Also Sasha stated that some people's attitude towards him had changed after they had found out that 
he had not served. However, he stated that it did not disturb him: ”But in principle it.. it does not  
really bother me because.. what is important is that I have remained myself and stayed alive and  
everything  is  OK with  me in general.”  Considering  that  being of  draft  age coincided with the 
Chechen wars, he thought that joining the army might have meant a life and death issue.
Furthermore, the  claim that every man should join the army and that becoming a soldier was an 
integral part of manhood and male socialization was  rejected by the interviewees as  ridiculous,  
absurd, propaganda, and old-fashioned. It was seen as an opinion of masses, something that people 
say and repeat without serious reflection beforehand. Maksim called it  ”a vestige of the Soviet  
times”. Also in Viktor's view the gender expectation was a product of the Soviet era and part of the 
wider militarization processes of the society: ”It was in the [Soviet] Union formed that the idea that  
a man has to serve was formed. Well,  it was a constant state of war. They simply brainwashed  
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people well, that you have to...”
In Dima's  opinion,  talking about  military service as  ”some kind of  a  masculine question”  was 
totally irrelevant:
If we understand it so that you did not serve [thus, you are not a real man]. It's exactly the same as if you don't have an 
iPhone, you're not a human being. That would be exactly the same as you didn't serve, thus you're not a man [laughs]. I am  
a man. [...] To say that if you didn't serve, you're not a man.. well, I think it's mostly propaganda.
Many, like Misha, simply ridiculed suspicions about their manliness:”If it's a girl who says to me  
that you're not a man because you haven't been in the military, I'll tell her: come on, let's go, I'll  
show you! [laughs]”. Also Anton rejected the idea that military service makes 'men'. He referred to 
an issue that has been of public concern in Russia lately and damaged the reputation of the armed 
forces;  namely the  growing  number  of  ex-convicts,  drug addicts  and mentally  ill  in  the  ranks 
(Zhel'vis 2011):
I don't think that today the military is the measure of a real man. Well, because.. there are people who have been in 
the army, but cannot call themselves and we and society can never call them real [men] because they are people  
who.. well, some of them, for example, are leading an asocial way of life, some a criminal way of life, that kind of 
people can hardly be called real [men]? I don't think so.
Taken together, the idea of military service and soldiering as markers of manhood was actively 
challenged and questioned by the interviewees. In the field narratives, the informants questioned 
common sense propositions about gender and masculinity,  as well  as the state's  contention that 
military service is a necessary practice through which one becomes a man and a full citizen. The 
interviewees thus showed that they were not passive recipients of cultural knowledge but actively 
participating in the construction and re-definitions of what it means to be a man in today's Russia.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, I have focused on presenting and analysing the field narratives. The results indicate 
that, among the present interviewees, both the conscription system and military service were seen as 
disempowering traps. Firstly, the fear of having to serve undermined individual men's possibilities 
to direct, shape and exercise control over their own lives. Secondly, the military was perceived as a 
degradating institution that denied individual agency and self-realization, as well as deprived young 
men  of  what  they  had  without  giving  anything  back  –  in  the  worst  case  leaving  them  with 
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psychological  problems  and/or  physically  disabled.  In  the  view  of  the  interviewees,  the  army 
molded  youngsters  into  an  obedient,  uncritical  and  passive  mass  that  was  unable  to  function 
successfully in the new, competitive market society. In other words, military service was seen to 
disempower individual, for the benefit of the state and the ruling elite.
However,  the  present  interviewees  demonstrated  both  willingness  and  capability  to  resist  the 
conscription  system that  they experienced  as  unjust  exploitation.  In  the  process,  cultivation  of 
critical  consciousness  played  an  important  role.  This  entailed  challenging  traditional  gender 
expectations and masculinity notions, which sought to define military service as a male citizenship 
duty and an essential milestone from boyhood to manhood, and that are crucial for maintaining the 
conscription system. Moreover, the interviewees were ciritical towards the state official's attempts 
to construct a continuity between the Soviet and Russian periods, and to continue to maintain a 
mass army with reference to history, especially the Great Patriotic War. They insisted that there was 
no way back to the old days, and that the only justifiable and up-to-date solution to the conscription  
crisis was transition to a professional, contract-based army.  Moreover, the field returns indicated 
that draft-avoidance had been a conscious choice,  and, thus a demonstration  of agency. In other 
words, instead of submitting themselves to the demands of the system, the inteviewees had decided 
to resist the draft and strive for the realization of self-defined goals, at the same time demanding the 
right to do so.
Furthermore, Connell (2000: 12) has pointed that masculinities ”come into existence as people act”. 
Hence, draft-avoidance can also be seen as an expression of the interviewees' masculine identities. 
As Goff & Dunn (2009a: 2) have noted, identities are ”constantly evolving in response to changing 
circumstances”. Already the educational backgrounds indicated that the present interviewees had 
embraced and were well  integrated into the market system. The analysis  of the field narratives 
showed that  the interviewees' self-definitions were indeed shaped and informed by the emerging 
masculinity notions and values integral to market capitalism. At the same time, they rejected the 
identity that the state tried to offer them as servers and defenders of the fatherland. Identities can 
also empower. The interviewees' self-identifications encouraged them to follow their own dreams 
and aspirations; to live for themselves and their families, not for the state or the collective; to be 
independent and strive for autonomy and self-sufficiency. In the context of the new Russia, the 
soldier represented qualities that had become unwanted; a relic of the Soviet era, a masculinity 
model that the changes of the past decades had turned into an anti-ideal.
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Chapter 6. Summary and concluding remarks
It is known that real social revolutions do not happen on barricades but in souls and in consciousness.
(Ruchkin 1998: 96)136
Introduction
This  thesis  has  attempted  to  answer  the  question  of  why  young  Russian  men  try  to  avoid 
compulsory military service.  It  has sought to provide insights into young men's  reflections and 
viewpoints  for  a  better  understanding  of  draft-avoidance.  The  study  has  been  based  on  nine 
qualitative  semi-structured  interviews.  To  explain  draft-avoidance,  it  has  drawn  on  a  gender 
perspective,  particularly  the  concept  of  masculinity.  The  term  empowerment,  including  the 
supplementary  categories  of  identity,  agency and  critical  consciousness, has  been  chosen  as  a 
theoretical lens to further illuminate the interviewees'  views on conscription and experiences of 
draft-avoidance.
Findings
The analysis  of  the  field  narratives  has  demonstrated that  the  present  interviewees'  viewed the 
conscription system as a relic of the Soviet era. Further, conscription was also seen as unjust and 
violating human rights; a suppressive and disempowering institution through which the state and the 
ruling elite exploit and consolidate their control over the citizens. Propaganda,  lack of knowledge 
and critical thinking, as well as other young men's lack of self-direction and agency were seen as 
factors  that  helped  maintaining  the  system.  Especially  noteworthy  was  that  what  the  present 
interviewees opposed to was not military service as such, but namely its compulsory nature.
The interviewees voiced a strong striving towards a fulfilling and interesting life. For them, this 
meant in particular being able to express and realize themselves by 'doing their own thing', for 
example, through work. Compulsory military service was seen to contradict with this aspiration and 
prevent one from leading a self-directed and satisfying life. Further, the interviewees rationalized 
and justified their  draft-avoidance also with  reference to  professionalism,  that  is,  claiming that 
becoming a soldier simply was not their path of life. Also the individualist claim that everyone 
should be free to decide about their own lives and not be forced to sacrifice personal benefit in the 
name  of  common  interest  was  an  important  part  of  the  interviewees'  argumentation  against 
conscription. Further, they saw their economic self-reliance and independence from the state as a 
136 My translation
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valid argument for not serving. The interviewees' social networks were largely supportive of their 
choice not to join the army,  and the field narratives indicated that avoiding service had in fact 
become a normalized practice in their social context. There were no striking differences between St. 
Petersburg, Samara, Murmansk and Pskov.
The analysis of the field narratives has shown that the interviewees' had to a considerable degree 
internalized emerging masculinity ideas, typical of market economy and capitalism. At the same 
time, the interviewees' sense of self encouraged them not to accept but resist subordination to the 
state, and can thus be seen as empowering. Hence, gender identity can have a transforming potential 
both at the individual and social level.  Against this background,  the state's attempts to enhance 
willingness to do military service by paternalistically telling young men what to think and do137 are 
likely to fail, at least among the present interviewees' reference groups. The interviewees' idea of 
masculinity and masculine identity were crucially about  personal  autonomy;  that is,  being and, 
feeling that, they themselves were able to define what they did. This was irreconcilable with the 
compulsory nature of military service. In the case of draft-avoidance, the paradox is that the same 
independent and self-sufficient male identity that appeared to be empowering also partly explains 
why young men do not unite to fight against the conscription system that they perceive as unjust 
and exploitative. The market system and its values encourage people to become more self-centered. 
Consequently, everybody focuses on minding his own business and taking care of himself.
In draft-avoidance, also critical consciousness played a central role. The interviewees demonstrated 
a critical attitude not only towards the conscription system but also to beliefs, gender stereotypes 
and expectations that have been used to justify and maintain universal male conscription both in the 
Soviet  and  post-Soviet  eras.  Taken  together,  the  present  interviewees  showed  that  they  were 
reflective and conscious actors, thereby making draft-avoidance a manifestation of their ability to 
exercise choice in a meaningful manner. By avoiding military service, the interviewees appeared to 
have expanded their ability to live the lives they wanted, which is a manifestation of agency and the 
core of empowerment.
Furthermore, draft-avoidance appeared to manifest  how people take their  destinies in their  own 
hands  and exercise  control  over  their  lives  in  times  of  social  transformations  characterized  by 
fluidity and uncertainty,  in relation to rules, behaviours and organisational arrangements. Specific 
examples  are  the  blurred  meanings  and  definitional  struggles  over  concerning  gender  roles, 
137 See e.g. Putin's speech from 2006 (Blum 2006: 2).
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gendered citizenship, the relationship between individual and the state (Zdravomyslova & Temkina 
2003a). The state officials interpret the issues in one way, and (young male) citizens in another, 
which  creates  a  conflict  situation. Draft-avoidance  calls  for  a  renegotiation  of  the  relationship 
between  the  state  and  citizens  and  redefinition  of  the  cultural  content  of  gender,  particularly 
masculinity.
Economically,  Russia  continues  its  integration  into  the  international  capitalist  system  (Eichler 
2012). This means that it is not only part of the global flow of goods, but ideas, values and lifestyles 
as well. As the study has also shown, people's self-identifications are more and more tied to the 
market economy, liberalism and democracy, as they take advantage of the freedoms and promises of 
globalization. However, many recent developments indicate that officialdom is trying to impede 
change and move the country politically back to the past, in the direction of the Soviet Union (e.g. 
Saari 2011)138. Since Putin's return to power in spring 2012, the grip on citizens and civil society has 
been tightened even more. In the past half a year, for example, several bills restricting freedom of 
expression, association and assembly have been passed in the State Duma  (Roberts 2012a; ibid. 
2012b).139
Analytical contributions
Coexistence of continuity and change
Analytically,  this  study  has  sought  to  contribute  to  understanding  of  social  transformation  by 
providing insights into change from the Soviet era to Russian. At the same time, it is reflective of 
and brings evidence to the on-going debate that there is no clear cut distinctions between change 
and continuity (McLeod & Thomson 2009: 8).  Instead, there is coexistence of the past and the 
present;  that  is,  change  and  continuity  are  not  mutually  excluding  (ibid.:  8,  124;  Kulmala  & 
Saarinen 2010: 13). Even today, more than twenty years after the disintegration of the USSR, Soviet 
ideas and practices are still strongly present in the contemporary Russian. A typical example of the 
old in the new is the conscription system, and certain gender notions that support it, which represent 
the  logic  of  the  authoritarian  and  militarized  Soviet  society  (Gol'ts 2005:  203),  not  of  liberal 
democracy.
Further, this study has sought to contribute to understanding of social change as a gradual  process. 
The fall of the Soviet power was abrupt, but profound social transformations are not; the old does 
138 According to Gudkov (2006: 47), today's Russia has ”a post-totalitarian semi-authoritarian regime”.
139 http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/06/back-soviet-future
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not vanish overnight. Today, Russia could be described as being in a transitional period, which is 
characterized by the coexistence of change and continuity.  The old values have not disappeared 
completely, and neither have the new values permeated all segments of society. It is namely this 
coexistence  of  change  and  continuity,  modernity  and  tradition,  that  seems  to  be  creating 
contradictions, tensions and conflict. This is manifest in the deepening crisis of the conscription 
system and growing draft-avoidance.  Hence, if social research focuses only on ”either explaining 
continuity or explaining change” (McLeod & Thomson 2009: 8), it might overlook certain issues of 
conflict  that rise namely from the coexistence of and contradictions between the two. If  social 
change  and  continuity  were  separate,  compulsory  military  service  and,  consequently,  draft-
avoidance hardly were such problematic questions in today's Russia.
Moreover, it is the present interviewees, as well as other young men, who are caught in-between the 
processes of continuity and change. They face contradictory demands and expectations; the market 
system emphasizes individual achievement, while the state demands subordination and collectivity. 
Draft-avoidance is their way of managing the situation and the challenges that the individual meets 
in a transitional society.
Is empowerment only good?
Most studies drawing on the concept of empowerment are normative in the sense that they assume 
empowerment  to  be  desirable  and  positive.  For  example,  Narayan  (2006:  16)  writes  that 
”[e]mpowerment has intrinsic value. It is an end in itself.” Moreover, empowerment is a value-laden 
term;  it  celebrates  the  wanting,  striving,  aspiring  and  acting  individual.  It  can,  however,  be 
questioned  whether  this  should  be  taken  as  a  universal  model  for  human  actualization  and 
fulfilment, or does it simply represent a Western and capitalist ideal (e.g. Mäkinen 2012).
Furthermore, we can and should ask if empowerment always is merely a good thing (Diener & 
Biswas-Diener  2006:  137). The  study has  shown that,  from time  to  time,  becoming  aware  of 
oppression and seeking change can be painful for the individual, but those who refuse to withdraw 
from their position, can also make considerable personal gains. This, however, is only one side of 
the story. Empowerment, like any other social process, has a context. Consequently, it is important 
to consider the present interviewees' individual perspectives also against the wider context of draft-
avoidance. Indeed, draft-avoidance liberates many young men. However, it simultaneously deepens 
the  stratification  of  Russian  society  as  a  whole,  as  someone  else  has  to  carry  the  burden  of 
compulsory military service (Mikhailenok 2006; Lokshin & Yemtsov 2005; Petrov 2003). Those 
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who do not have the resources needed to negotiate themselves free from service, find their agency 
and voice inhibited and are prevented from pursuing their interests and aspirations (see  Kabeer 
1999: 438). In other words, someone's liberation can be someone else's trap. Hence, praising draft-
avoidance as a merely desirable manifestation of empowerment would be context-blind.
Nevertheless, individual actions and draft resistance do undermine the conscription system as a 
whole, as they have already forced the state to change its defence policies (Webber & Zilberman 
2006: 188). Hence, individual draft-avoidance can be seen as an important starting point for social 
change, and time will show if it is to force also profound structural transformations (see Kabeer 
2005: 16). At least Viktor was optimistic about the future and believed that with time, individual 
actions will create enough pressure on the government and lead to abolishment of conscription:
In  the  end,  the  authorities  will  have  to  change.  It's  like  with  serfdom.  In  the  middle  of  it,  it  did  not  cross  
anyone's  mind  that  they  did  not  have  to  be  serfs.  Everyone  thought  that  we  will  always  be  serfs.  But  then  
simply  the  national,  the  societal  consciousness  matured  and  everyone  understood  that  I  don't  have  to  be  a  
slave. That's how it is with the army, too. […] People will understand that they don't owe anyone anything.
The importance of first person accounts
As  noted  earlier,  young  men  themselves  have  been  largely  invisible  and  silent  in  the  public 
discussions and protests concerning conscription. Instead, the Committee of the Soldiers' Mothers 
has been regarded as their voice, something which also previous academic research has tended to 
strengthen by giving priority to 3rd person accounts. In this study, on the contrary, the departure 
point has been that, in order to understand draft-avoidance and the problems related to compulsory 
military service,  it  is  important  to  obtain first-hand knowledge from draft-avoiders  themselves. 
Asking people about their lives and opinions does not only help to understand them and ”grasp the 
subject's perspective” (Corbetta 2003: 264). It is respectful and fosters their agency, as 1st person 
accounts vocalize social actors.
The study has sought to contribute to in-depth knowledge about how people experience and manage 
transitional periods and social change by giving direct insight into young men's life worlds and 
reflections. In this, qualitative interviewing has been a crucial method. It has allowed tapping into 
first-hand experiences and self-expression and, consequently, to complement the previous research 
about draft-avoidance in Russia with new perspectives, particularly empowerment. In doing so, the 
study has thus brought evidence about how masculinity notions are intertwined with personal and 
social transformations, as well as the importance of first-person accounts in relation to the study of 
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social  change  (see  e.g.  Kulmala  &  Saarinen  2010:  13).  Furthermore,  recognizing  that  all 
perspectives are valuable and that it is important to look at military service avoidance from different 
angles  and bring  several  viewpoints  together,  it  has  striven  to  contribute  to  a  better  and more 
holistic understanding of the phenomenon.
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